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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by § 78-2-2(3)(j), U.C.A. This is an appeal
from a judgment, dated April 23, 1990, of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah. Notice of Appeal was filed May 23, 1990. On July 31, 1990, this
case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(4),
U.C.A. On February 20, 1992, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District
Court. A new judgment was entered by the District Court on January 11, 1993. Notice of
Appeal was filed February 10, 1993.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I

THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF THIS
COURT ON REMAND BY MERELY BOLSTERING THE CONCLUSION
ALREADY REACHED AND BY REFUSING TO MAKE FINDINGS ON THE
ISSUES OF FORFEITURE AND RENT.
Standard of Review: Correctness, since this is entirely a matter for the
appellate court to determine.

POINT II

NEW WEST IS BOUND BY THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT AS
A PARTY TO IT, BY THE REPRESENTATIONS OF ITS AGENT AS TO THE
EFFECT THEREOF, AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO TERRACE FALLS
OR UNDER THIRD-PARTY-BENEFICIARY THEORY.
Standard of Review:
A. Construction of several agreements together as one agreement is an issue of
law reviewed for correctness. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake
City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1358 (Utah App. 1987).
B. Ambiguity of the agreements is an issue of law reviewed for correctness.
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). Construction of extrinsic
evidence to resolve the ambiguity is a matter of fact reviewed under the clearly
v

erroneous standard, Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279 (Utah
App. 1987), unless no regard need be given to the demeanor of witnesses and
those facts were determined based on what was considered to be reasonable.
Reasonableness is a matter of law reviewed for correctness. First Sec. Bank of
Utah v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983).
C. Actual or apparent authority of an agent involves mixed questions of law and
fact which "do not require the deference due to findings on questions of pure
fact." Mareulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). Deference is
to be accorded to facts found by the lower court from disputed evidence but the
legal conclusions resulting from those facts are questions of law which are
reviewed for correctness. Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991).
However, facts determined based on what was considered to be reasonable are
reviewed for correctness. First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078
(Utah 1983).
D and E. Interpretation of an agreement is a matter of law reviewed for
correctness. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357,
1358 (Utah App. 1987).
POINT III

MARGETTS WAS INDUCED TO ENTER INTO THE AGREEMENTS
WITH AMERICAN AND TO RELEASE HIS LIEN BY IMPROPER
CONDUCT, WHETHER TERMED FRAUD, DURESS, COERCION, MISTAKE,
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, UNCONSCIONABHJTY, OR UNFAIR
DEALING AND IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OR DAMAGES.
Standard of Review: Deference is to be accorded to facts found by the
lower court from disputed evidence but the legal conclusions resulting from those
facts are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. Bellon v. Malnar,
808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991).

POINT IV

IF THE CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS NOT
ENFORCED IN MARGETTS' FAVOR, HE IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT
FOR THE PAYMENTS MADE OR CREDIT GIVEN UNDER THE
CONTRACT BASED ON UNCONSCIONABLE FORFEITURE.
Standard of Review: Unconscionability is a matter of law revic ble for
correctness. No findings were made by the lower court on this issue b those
facts are not in dispute. Therefore, this issue is a matter of law to be re wed
for correctness. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991).

POINT V

THE JUDGMENT AGAINST MARGETTS FOR THE FAIR REN \ L
VALUE IN THE AMOUNT OF $17,100 WAS UNSUPPORTED BY HE
EVIDENCE OR THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND IS CONTRARY TO L VV.
vi

Standard of Review: The facts are not in dispute so whether those facts
support the claim for rent is a legal conclusion to be reviewed for correctness.
Gravson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
POINT VI

THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR $21,600 IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS NOR THE LAW AND MUST BE REVERSED.
Standard of Review: The facts are not in dispute so whether those facts
support the claim of unlawful detainer is a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness. Asav v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988).

POINT VII
THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES MUST BE OVERTURNED
BECAUSE IT IS NOT BASED ON ANY STATUTE OR AGREEMENT NOR
SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE.
Standard of Review: Since there was no evidence introduced on the
question of attorney's fees, the propriety of the award of attorney's fees is
entirely a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Commerce Financial
v. Markwest Corp.. 806 P.2d 200, 202 (Utah App. 1990).
POINT VIII
THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS CONTRARY TO
LAW SINCE THE DAMAGES COULD NOT BE CALCULATED PRECISELY
AND WERE FOR THE TRIER-OF-FACT TO DETERMINE.
Standard of Review: Correctness. Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah
County, 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992).

STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
§ 78-36-3, Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-36-6, Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-36-10, Utah Code Annotated
(See Addendum for full text).
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a California
corporation, successor-ininterest to AMERICAN SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a California
corporation,
Case No. 930450-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOHN L. MARGETTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff New West Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter referred
to as "New West") filed a complaint against defendant John L. Margetts (hereinafter
referred to as "Margetts") to enforce an agreement to buy a condominium unit from New
West or, in the alternative, to obtain possession of the property and a judgment for the
rental value of the property. Margetts' answer asserted that he was coerced into signing the
purchase agreement by fraud and duress and the simultaneous signing of another agreement
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which would have given him credit for the full amount of the purchase price for the
condominium unit and also into giving up a trust deed lien against the whole condominium
project. He counterclaimed for a deed to the unit, for offsets for expenses paid to complete
the unit, for the value of sales of other units made by Margetts for New West and for the
value of Margetts' security services in the project.
Course of the Proceedings
After Trial the lower court entered judgment in favor of New West in the
amount of $32,031.00 for rental of the unit, prejudgment interest and treble damages, plus
attorney's fees of $20,515.00 and terminating any interest of Margetts in the condominium
and granting possession thereof to New West. A Notice of Appeal was filed on May 23,
1990, and the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals on July 31, 1990. After Briefing
and oral argument, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court for failure
to make sufficient findings of fact and remanded the case on the issues of agency, fraud and
remedies with instructions to "clarify in its ruling why both forfeiture and rent are being
awarded" and "with leave to conduct such further proceedings as the trial court may deem
appropriate." The Court of Appeals further stated "we do not intend our remand to be
merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached."
Disposition in the Lower Court
On remand, New West merely submitted supplemental findirgs of fact and
conclusions of law to bolster and support the conclusion already reached

id, without

conducting further proceedings except oral argument by counsel, the lower cc t adopted
those supplemental findings and conclusions with only minor changes in wording. The lower

2

court did not enter any further findings on the issue of remedies and did not clarify why both
forfeiture and rent were awarded. New West submitted a form of judgment to the lower
court which included an award of attorney's fees incurred after remand. After objection by
Margetts, the lower court entered a new judgment on January 11, 1993, striking out the
award of attorney's fees incurred after remand, but again awarding New West a judgment
in the amount of $32,031.00 for rental of the unit, prejudgment interest and treble damages,
plus attorney's fees of $20,515.00 and terminating any interest of Margetts in the
condominium and granting possession thereof to New West. The judgment also awarded
New West additional prejudgment interest on the entire judgment to the date thereof.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On October 3, 1980, Margetts entered into an Exchange Agreement with
Garden Falls Condominiums, the predecessor in interest of New West, by which Margetts
agreed to exchange a condominium in Park City for a condominium in what later became
known as Terrace Falls Condominiums at Third Avenue and "A" Street in Salt Lake City.
Because the Terrace Falls Condominiums had not yet been built, Margetts was given a Trust
Deed on the Terrace Falls Condominiums as security for conveyance to him of the
completed condominium.
2. On December 9, 1981, Garden Falls Condominiums persuaded Margetts to
enter into a new agreement, a Condominium Acquisition Agreement, with Terrace Falls
Condominiums, a limited partnership, the new name for Garden Falls Condominiums, by
which Margetts would receive credit towards the purchase of a designated condominium unit
in the project of $200,000.00 plus 15% thereof per year from December 9, 1981 until the
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date of closing in return for a subordination of his Trust Deed against the project to
construction financing (Exh.2). A new trust deed in favor of Margetts was recorded
December 22, 1981 (Exh. 3).

Other parties with claims similar to Margetts' also

subordinated their liens against the property (R. 538, p.32).
3. By September of 1984, the condominium project was only partially completed,
the construction financing with American was in default and Terrace Falls Condominiums
had agreed to deed the project to American in lieu of foreclosure upon obtaining releases
of the liens of other creditors in order to avoid the negative publicity of a foreclosure and
accomplish a smooth, quick and easy transition (R. 538, pp. 39-41). A written Real Property
Purchase and Sale Agreement (Exh. 4) was prepared and eventually signed by which
American purchased from Terrace Falls Condominiums the entire project including all
personal and intangible property such as "the business of selling or leasing units, or the
ownership or rental of condominiums," the name "Terrace Falls," and "any other rights of
[Terrace Falls] or its predecessor in interest in connection with the Property" (Exh. 4, H 2).
4. On September 6, 1984, Gerald Snow, an attorney, called Margetts' attorney,
requesting Margetts to meet with Lee Stevens of American Savings & Loan, the construction
lender on the Terrace Falls Condominiums, on September 12, 1984 (R.539, p.292). This was
followed by a letter from Gerald Snow, dated September 7, 1984, confirming this request
(Exh. 5).
5. At the meeting on September 12, 1984, Mr. Snow and Mr. St, ^ns of
American Savings & Loan told Margetts that Terrace Falls Condominiums and its pr

ipals

were insolvent and that American Savings and Loan was going to foreclose its fii

trust
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deed against the Terrace Falls Condominiums and cut off all of Margetts' rights therein
unless it could obtain a release of all junior liens against the project, including Margetts'
trust deed. Mr. Snow and Mr. Stevens offered Mr. Margetts $20,000.00 for a release of his
trust deed against the condominium project. Margetts refused this offer and left the
meeting. Mr. Snow called later to increase the offer to $50,000.00 or a credit of $150,000.00
towards the purchase of a condominium (R. 539, pp. 203-4; R. 538, pp. 61-63).
6.

Mr. Snow prepared and delivered several agreements (Condominium

Purchase Agreement, Settlement Agreement, General Release, and Request for
Reconveyance-Exh. 6-9, 15), giving Margetts the $150,000.00 credit and made several
requests of Margetts and his attorney over the next two months that the agreements be
signed and returned because all other lien holders had settled and Margetts was holding up
the whole settlement (R. 539, pp.268-274, 206-207; R. 538, p. 135). Margetts refused to do
so.
7. Because Margetts was leaving town for two weeks and Mr. Snow was anxious
to conclude a settlement with Margetts, Mr. Snow arranged a meeting with Margetts, without
his attorney, on November 14, 1984. Margetts again refused to sign the agreements (R. 538,
pp. 125-6; R. 539, p. 210). Mr. Snow asked him to return that afternoon at which time Mr.
Snow thought he could present a better deal to him (R. 539, p. 211).
8. Margetts met with Mr. Snow again that afternoon at which time he was
presented with an additional agreement with Terrace Falls Condominiums (Exh. 10 and 16)
which would give him an additional credit towards the purchase of the designated
condominium unit of 20% of the proceeds of the sale of other units in the condominium
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project as an inducement to get him to sign the previously prepared condominium purchase
agreement, settlement agreement, general release, and request for reconveyance. Mr. Snow
assured Margetts that the other agreements would not be delivered until this twenty percent
agreement was signed and that American Savings would be bound by that agreement. Mr.
Margetts thereupon signed all the agreements (R. 538, pp. 139-140; R. 539, pp. 212-214).
He further told Margetts that he would get what he wanted by that agreement, that only
seven condominiums had to be sold to completely pay for his condominium, and that
American Savings did not have to sign the agreement to be bound by it because American
would be Terrace Falls Condominiums.
9. Margetts' trust deed in the project was reconveyed (Exh. 11) and Terrace
Falls Condominiums gave to American Savings and Loan a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure
conveying the entire project to American and American took over the completion and
operation of the project (Exh. 4).
10. These agreements called for the closing of the sale of the condominium unit
to Margetts after it was ready for occupancy and certain specified finish items had been
completed in the unit, which would be no later than June 30, 1985 (Exh. 6,11 6; Exh. 7,1f 6).
11. American did not complete the unit by June 30, 1985 and did not finish the
unit as required by the agreement (Exh. 22, 24-27). Margetts paid some $9,234.00 of his
own money to finish the unit (R. 465, p.3) and he was told by American's attorney to move
into the unit on August 25, 1985 even though American did not have a certificate of
occupancy and could not deliver title to Margetts (R.539, p. 226-8).
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12. After Margetts moved into the unit, American dismissed their security
personnel on the project relying on Margetts' presence in the project as security for the
whole project (R. 539, p. 233).
13.

American did not form the owners association for the condominium project

until September 1, 1987 and told Margetts not to pay any assessments, taxes, or rent on the
unit (R. 539, pp. 233-5).
14. In reliance on the twenty percent agreement signed as an inducement for
Margetts to enter into the Condominium Purchase Agreement and other agreements,
Margetts persuaded five of his acquaintances to buy condominium units in the project (R.
539, p. 230).
15. When American was finally prepared to close the transaction and convey
title to Margetts, it refused to give him credit for 20% of the proceeds of units sold to
purchasers obtained by Margetts or for the cost of finish items paid by Margetts. It also
refused to allow him to select another unit as provided in the agreements.
16. On March 25, 1989, New West, as the successor-in-interest to American,
caused a Notice to Quit to be mailed to Margetts demanding that he vacate the unit within
five (5) days (R. 538, p. 178).
17. When Margetts did not vacate the unit, New West commenced this action
for unlawful detainer (R. 2-24) and Margetts filed a counterclaim asserting that he was
entitled to a deed to the unit, that he was induced by fraud and deception to surrender his
trust deed on the project and to pay an additional $134,283.00 for his unit and that he was
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entitled to a credit for the finish items paid for by him and further amounts for security
services against the purchase price of his unit (R. 27-51).
18. Trial was held November 14-16, 1989, resulting in the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 512-20) and Judgment (R. 522-24), dated April 23, 1990, which
judgment included rent prior to the Notice to Quit and prejudgment interest thereon as well
as treble damages after the Notice to Quit and attorneys' fees incurred in obtaining
possession of the condominium unit.
19. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was transferred to the Court of
Appeal and, after hearing, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court for
failure to make sufficient findings of fact and remanded the case on the issues of agency,
fraud and remedies with instructions to "clarify in its ruling why both forfeiture and rent are
being awarded" and "with leave to conduct such further proceedings as the trial court may
deem appropriate." The Court of Appeals further stated "we do not intend our remand to
be merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached (R. 54345).
20. On remand, New West merely submitted supplemental findings of fact and
conclusions of law to bolster and support the conclusion already reached and, without
conducting further proceedings except oral argument by counsel, the lower court adopted
those supplemental findings and conclusions with only minor changes in wordin

The lower

court did not enter any further findings on the issue of remedies and did not claril why both
forfeiture and rent were awarded (R. 851-862). New West submitted a form of j dgment
to the lower court which included an award of attorney's fees incurred after rema i. After
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objection by Margetts, the lower court entered a new judgment on January 11, 1993, striking
out the award of attorney's fees incurred after remand, but again awarding New West a
judgment in the amount of $32,031.00 for rental of the unit, prejudgment interest and treble
damages, plus attorney's fees of $20,515.00 and terminating any interest of Margetts in the
condominium and granting possession thereof to New West. The judgment also awarded
New West additional prejudgment interest on the entire judgment to the date thereof (R.
872-74).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THIS COURTS REMAND MANDATE.
In remanding this case for further findings and conclusions, this court specifically
directed the lower court to conduct further proceedings as necessary in order that the
remand would not be an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already
reached. Express directions were given to reconsider the issues of agency, fraud and
remedies, especially the forfeiture of Margetts' interest in the condominium. The lower
court failed to follow this mandate and simply entered supplemental findings and conclusions
which had been prepared and submitted by New West. It failed to make any findings on
the issue of forfeiture as directed.

II. NEW WEST IS BOUND BY TERRACE FALLS' TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT.
New West has based this action on documents which Margetts adamantly refused
to sign until he was presented with the Twenty Percent Agreement as incentive and
inducement to sign the others. They were all signed at the same time and as a part of the
same transaction and must be construed together as one agreement. That means that New
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West is jointly bound with Terrace Falls to perform the promises made to Margetts in return
for the release of his lien. The total agreement is inconsistent, unenforceable and void
unless Margetts' view of the total agreement is adopted. Only that view makes any sense
and preserves the total agreement.
Snow was authorized by American to act for it in obtaining a release from
Margetts. Whatever he did and represented in the course of obtaining that release is
binding on American. If actual authority was not present, the facts show that American
placed Snow in a position where all offers and communications came through him and
Margetts was justified in relying on Snow's actions and representations. American and its
successor, New West, are bound by the representations Snow made to Margetts as to the
effect of the agreement he was signing.
New West's predecessor purchased everything owned by Terrace Falls, leaving
it with nothing.

It purchased the name 'Terrace Falls" and the business of selling

condominiums. It agreed to pay any sums required to be paid to obtain the release from
Margetts. It intentionally chose to step into Terrace Falls' shoes rather than foreclose and
terminate Margetts' interest. It still does business as Terrace Falls Condominiums and is
selling the units from which Margetts' unit was to be paid for. New West is obligated to
perform the agreement with Margetts and honor the representations made to him by
crediting him with twenty percent of the proceeds of the sales of other units. Mai etts is
also the third party beneficiary of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement between Tt ace
Falls and American and is entitled to enforce directly against New West the benefits to )w
to Margetts from the total agreement between the parties.
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III. MARGETTS IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OR DAMAGES.
The representations made to Margetts induced him to give up his lien on the
property. Therefore, if he does not receive the credit towards the purchase of his unit, he
is entitled to rescission and reinstatement of his lien or damages for his loss on the grounds
of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, duress, mistake, unconscionability or unfair dealing.
IV. MARGETTS IS ENTITLED TO A $142,134 JUDGMENT FOR UNCONSCIONABLE
FORFEITURE OF HIS PAYMENTS AND CREDIT UNDER THE AGREEMENT.
Margetts has lost in excess of $300,000 on this transaction for which American
agreed to give him credit of $150,000 in return for substantial value flowing to American.
When American refused to close the sale of the condominium on the terms represented to
him, American, without properly terminating the agreement, brought this action. The lower
court terminated Margetts' interest in the condominium and forfeited his $150,000 plus the
$9,234 he paid to complete the unit. American's only damages were $17,100 in rental value
which is unconscionably disproportionate to the amount forfeited. Margetts is entitled to
a judgment for the difference.
V. THE JUDGMENT FOR RENT HAS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT.
A judgment for rent must be based either on an agreement to pay rent or on
unjust enrichment. There was no agreement to pay rent and New West did not plead nor
prove the essential elements of unjust enrichment. Most importantly, New West received
a substantial benefit from Margetts' occupancy and Margetts suffered a substantial detriment
in not receiving his condominium. Under those circumstances it cannot be concluded that
it is inequitable for Margetts to retain any benefit he may have received by temporarily
occupying the condominium.
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VI. NEW WEST WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PROCEED UNDER THE UNLAWFUL
DETAINER STATUTE AND THE JUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED.
New West attempted to take advantage of the severe and summary remedies of
the Unlawful Detainer Statute without complying with its strict requirements. There was no
periodic tenancy and no conversion of that tenancy to a tenancy at will. The Notice to Quit
was not served on Margetts as required by statute and was not served on his wife at all.
Furthermore, his wife was not even joined in this action so any unlawful detainer by
Margetts caused no loss to New West because she still had the right of possession. At most,
only nominal damages could be awarded.
VIL THERE WAS NO CONTRACT, STATUTE OR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
An award of attorney's fees must be supported by evidence. No evidence was
submitted to the lower court. There was no statute which authorized attorney's fees and the
only contract which provided for fees was not in dispute and no judgment was obtained
under that contract. In fact, New West abandoned its claim under that contract. That
contract, the Condominium Purchase Agreement, was only in dispute if the court held the
Twenty Percent Agreement to be a part of that contract, in which event Margetts must
prevail on the merits and attorney's fees should be awarded to him.
VIII. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS NOT ALLOWABLE.
The prejudgment interest included in the first judgment was calculatec

i what

the court found to be the fair rental value of the property. That finding is the prov, e of
the trier-of-fact from the testimony of experts and, therefore, could not have

xn

determined at the time with mathematical certainty. The amount of the second judg ent
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for rental value, unlawful detainer and attorney's fees could also not be calculated in
advance with mathematical precision and the award of prejudgment interest thereon was
error. Prejudgment interest may not be included in the judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
MANDATE OF THIS COURT ON REMAND BY MERELY
BOLSTERING THE CONCLUSION ALREADY REACHED AND
BY REFUSING TO MAKE FINDINGS ON THE ISSUES OF
FORFEITURE AND RENT.
The Memorandum Decision of this Court remanded the case on the issues of
agency, fraud and remedies for lack of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law and
also directed the lower court to "clarify in its ruling why both forfeiture and rent are being
awarded." The Decision further stated that "we do not intend our remand to be merely an
exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached" and granted "leave to
conduct such further proceedings as the trial court may deem appropriate." (R. 545-46).
A. The lower court failed to conduct further proceedings which
would allow it to do more than "bolster" its prior conclusion.
This Court's remand recognized how easy it is for the lower court, having once
made a decision, to bolster that decision with whatever findings are required to support it.
That is a natural inclination, especially years after the decision. And certainly a prevailing
party would be inclined to submit to the court proposed findings and conclusions to bolster
the prior conclusion in its favor. Despite this Court's direction to the contrary, that is
precisely what happened on remand of this case. New West's attorneys merely submitted
proposed supplemental findings and conclusions which filled in the some of the holes found
13

by this Court on the prior appeal and the lower court, with only minor changes in wording,
adopted those proposed supplemental findings and conclusions intact, after hearing the
arguments of the parties but without taking any further evidence or conducting further
proceedings. The deficiencies in this procedure become apparent when the transcript of the
lower court's actual findings and conclusions made from the bench at the conclusion of the
trial on November 16, 1989, (as opposed to what New West prepared and finally came
before the court for signing more than five months later on April 23, 1990) is compared to
the findings and conclusions made by the court at the conclusion of the hearing on remand.1
At the conclusion of the trial the lower court did not even consider the agency
and authority of Mr. Snow to be an issue. The court stated:
I think, unfortunately, we lost ourselves in the forest of authority
and agency, and avoided the inevitable problems the Court is stuck
with in construing contract law under consistently recognized
principles in the State of Utah. [R. 469, lines 6-10].
In this particular case, whether you conclude ~ if you were to
conclude that Mr. Snow was acting with apparent authority or
ostensible authority, you've still got the contracts and the agreements

1

This case illustrates what, for this advocate, has been a frustrating departure in
practice from what the rules require. Rule 52, U.R.C.P., states that "the court shall find the
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon." In practice the court
directs the prevailing party to prepare findings and conclusions and to submit them to the
court. The prevailing party then submits detailed findings and conclusions which best
support the decision in its favor but often go far beyond what the court actu 1y found.
When these are challenged by the opposing party and a hearing held, often weeks iter, the
court has forgotten many of the details of the case and is inclined to adopt the fine <*s and
conclusions as submitted. It is recognized that it would be an additional burden on t :ourt
to prepare and make detailed findings and conclusions at the conclusion of t
but
experience shows that the time required and the burden on the court would be far le^ than
that required by the lengthy and sometimes numerous hearings held on objections ) and
motions to amend findings and conclusions.
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to consider. And the one agreement, the 20 Percent Agreement, is
performable by Terrace Falls and its principals, not by American
Savings. [R. 470, line 21-471, line 2].
That is the extent of the court's comments on agency and authority. It did not even
determine whose version of the conversation between Margetts and Snow was accurate.
That was also not an issue in the court's mind. It proceeded only to determine whether
fraud had been proved, claiming that was the only basis on which the court could avoid the
language of the Twenty Percent Agreement. [R. 471, lines 3-6]. Its conclusion that fraud
had not been proved was not based on what was said or whether agency existed but entirely
on the language of the Twenty Percent Agreement and Margetts' supposed knowledge that
that agreement did not say what Snow told him it said [R. 471, lines 7-21] ignoring entirely
the pressure which Snow placed on Margetts to sign the agreements that day in the absence
of his attorney and Margetts inability to confirm what Snow was telling him.
So the court did not focus on who told the truth and didn't think it necessary to
decide that or the issue of agency. The theory is that the trier of fact is to determine the
credibility of witnesses based on demeanor and other factors that may not show in the
printed transcript. But the court in this case did not do that because it wasn't important to
its decision. Three years later, however, without taking further evidence, the court adopted
the findings prepared by the victor to "bolster" the prior decision and claims it can now
determine whose version of the facts was true. Yet, looking at the cold transcript three
years later, the lower court was in no better position to judge credibility than is the appellate
court. This is confirmed by the reason given by the lower court for now determining whose
version of the facts was true. That reason is not based upon the demeanor of the witnesses

15

nor anything else that does not appear in the record. It is based solely on the court's
conclusion that Margetts was an experienced business man2 who should have demanded
that Snow put his statements in writing and, therefore, it was not reasonable for Margetts
to rely upon any representations or conduct of Snow. The court stated that "it was not
reasonable for Defendant Margetts to rely upon any assumed representations or conduct by
Mr. Snow." [R. 925, lines 17-19].
What is reasonable is a matter of law and can be determined by the appellate
court. A careful review of all of the undisputed facts shows that Margetts' version of the
conversation with Snow is the only reasonable view. That is demonstrated in Point II.B
below. The Supplemental Findings were quite obviously submitted by New West and
adopted by the lower court in an attempt to "bolster" the conclusion previously reached by
filling in the holes found to exist by this Court on the prior appeal. Thus, the lower court
has failed to carry out the mandate given by this Court on remand to conduct further
proceedings which would enable it to make appropriate findings on the issues of agency and
fraud.
B. The lower court failed to conduct further proceedings on the
issue of remedies or to clarify why both forfeiture and rent were
awarded.
This Court's opinion stated that because the remand

2. It is interesting to note that there is little or no evidence in the record of
rgetts'
business experience. The only evidence was that he had training as an engineer aiu orkcd
in and for businesses as an engineer and that he had no training as an attorney. , . 538,
pp. 198-9, 242-3]. The lower court's conclusion on this point seemed to be based or e fact
that Margetts "appeared . . . to be a senior citizen" and "had been around and ha * some
ability." [R. 920-1].
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may affect the determination of who is at fault for failure to close
the sale, as well as the question of whether Margetts forfeited his
$150,000 credit, we also remand the issue of remedies. In the event
that the trial court again awards a similar combination of remedies,
the trial court should clarify in its ruling why both forfeiture and rent
are being awarded. [R. 545].
This remand clearly required the lower court to justify the forfeiture of Margetts' substantial
interest in the condominium while at the same time awarding rent and other damages to
New West. Yet, no additional findings were made on this point and the conclusions [R. 8612] merely repeated the conclusions previously entered [R. 518]. In addressing this question
in its ruling from the bench, the lower court stated that "there's perhaps some confusion on
the part of the Appellate Court" [R. 926] and, while it recognized merit in the arguments
of counsel, did not feel that they were included in the remand. [R.930-1]. Therefore, the
lower court either misunderstood the remand order or ignored it. In any event, it made no
clarification of its ruling which forfeited Margetts' interest in the condominium while
awarding damages to New West. The importance of this issue is demonstrated in Point IV
below. The failure of the lower court to address this issue, although it recognized the merit
of it, requires a reversal of its judgment and an award of damages to Margetts.
POINT II
NEW WEST IS BOUND BY THE TWENTY PERCENT
AGREEMENT AS A PARTY TO IT, BY THE REPRESENTATIONS
OF ITS AGENT AS TO THE EFFECT THEREOF, AS
SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO TERRACE FALLS OR UNDER
THIRD-PARTY-BENEFICIARY THEORY.
A. New West is bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement as a
party to it because it was an essential part of the total agreement
between the parties.
It is clear from the testimony of Margetts and Snow that Margetts would not
have signed the Condominium Purchase Agreement, Settlement Agreement, General
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Release and Request for Reconveyance if the Twenty Percent Agreement were not part of
the total agreement. He had already refused to sign those other agreements several times
including on the morning of November 14, 1984, when he met with Snow. On that occasion,
Snow told him to come back later that day because "maybe there's a way that we can get
you Condominium 413" [R. 539, p. 211]. When Margetts returned Snow presented him with
the Twenty Percent Agreement as an "incentive" [R. 539, p. 211] and explained to him that
"they only have to sell seven condominiums and your condominium will be paid for" [R.. 539,
p. 212] and that Margetts would get what he wanted by such an agreement [R. 539, p. 213].
Margetts was clearly induced to sign the other documents by the presentation of the Twenty
Percent Agreement and would not have signed those documents without it [R. 538, p. 130,
R. 539, p. 219]. Snow even wrote on the Twenty Percent Agreement that the others would
not be delivered unless the Twenty Percent Agreement was signed and delivered
simultaneously [Exh. 16, R. 538, p. 134].
Under these circumstances the principle set forth in Bullfrog Marina Inc. v.
Lentz, 28 U.2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270-71 (Utah 1972) applies:
[T]he trial court found that after full consideration of the entire
transaction, including the purpose to be served by the lease and the
employment contract, defendant would not have leased the boats to
plaintiff, unless he could operate the houseboat rental service. The
trial court concluded that the lease and employment contract bore
a relationship to one another and should be considered as one
agreement.... [W]here two or more instruments are executed by
the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the
course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject matter,
they will be read and construed together so far as determining the
respective rights and interests of the parties although they do not in
terms refer to each other.
See also Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357 (Utah 1987);
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987); First Security Bank v.
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Maxwell 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983).

Likewise the agreements to purchase the

condominium and to release the trust deed would not have been signed without the Twenty
Percent Agreement. They should be considered as one agreement.
B. The total agreement between the parties is so ambiguous as
to be unenforceable and void unless Margetts' view of that
agreement is adopted. Only that view makes any sense and shows
a meeting of the minds.
New West has, in Point I of its brief on the prior appeal, argued that the
Condominium Purchase Agreement was clear and unambiguous on its face and, therefore,
not subject to modification by extrinsic evidence. That argument may have validity when
applied to the Condominium Purchase Agreement itself. But that document is not the
agreement between the parties that is at issue in this case and that argument ignores the
reason for the entire dispute. It is without dispute that Margetts had refused to sign any
agreement with American until the Twenty Percent Agreement was presented to him and
he was assured that American would be bound by it. The Twenty Percent Agreement was
signed at the same time and as a part of the same transaction as the Condominium Purchase
Agreement and it, plus Snow's explanation of it, was the inducement for Margetts to sign
the Condominium Purchase Agreement. Therefore, the Twenty Percent Agreement was a
part of the total agreement between the parties and all of these documents must be
construed together as one agreement. Bullfrog Marina Inc. v. Lentz, supra at 18.
When these documents are construed together as one agreement, even New
West admits that they are inconsistent [see Appellee's Brief on prior appeal, p. 10, lines 1819] and, therefore, ambiguous. Resort to extrinsic evidence is necessary to resolve the
ambiguity and that requires the court to consider the statements made by Snow to Margetts
to induce him to sign the agreements. Those statements, themselves, are admitted by New
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West to be inconsistent with the agreements [see Appellee's Brief on prior appeal, p. 21,
lines 4-6] but only those statements explain why Margetts finally signed the documents after
having refused to do so for so long. Only when Snow told Margetts that he would get what
he wanted by such an agreement (the condominium he had bargained for), that American
"will be Terrace Falls Condominiums" and be bound by the agreement and that "they only
have to sell seven condominiums and your condominium will be paid for" [R. 239, pp. 2124]-only then, did Margetts sign the documents.
Margetts' action in finally signing those documents, after refusing to do so for so
long, and the inconsistencies in the documents and the statements only make sense if
American was a party to the total agreement and was bound by it. Otherwise, the total
agreement is so inconsistent and ambiguous as to be unenforceable and, therefore, void.
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976); Valcarce v.
Bitters, 12 U.2d 61, 362 P.2d 427 (1961). Preservation and enforceability of the total
agreement require that Margetts' view of the transaction be adopted. That requires that he
be given credit for twenty percent of the sales price of all condominiums sold against the
purchase price of his unit.
C. Snow had both actual and apparent authority to act for and
bind American to the representations he made as to the effect of the
agreement Margetts signed.
New West, of course, contends that it is not bound by the Twenty Percent
Agreement because it was not signed by American Savings even though it has accepted and
had the benefit of the consideration given by Margetts for that agreement. Margetts, of
course, only knew what Snow was telling him so the question is whether he was justified in
relying upon Snow. From the very beginning of these negotiations with American, Snow was
its spokesman. At the first meeting with a representative of American it was Snow who did
20

the talking [R. 539, p. 264], and it was Snow who made the offer to Margetts [R. 539, p.
265]. It was clear that the offer was being made by American and that any deal would have
to be made with American. It would be paying the money or conveying the unit being
offered. After that meeting it was Snow who called to increase the offer and it was Snow
who had all further contact with Margetts or his attorney right up to the signing of all of the
documents by Margetts. It was Snow who drafted the documents presented to Margetts and
who revised those documents at the request of Margetts. There was no question in
Margetts' mind that Snow was speaking for and representing American. This was especially
true when Snow told him "they only have to sell seven condominiums and your condominium
will be paid for" [R. 539, p. 212], that he would get what he wanted by such an agreement
[R. 539, p. 213] and American doesn't need to sign the agreement because "with the deed-inlieu of foreclosure, they will be Terrace Falls Condominiums" [R. 539, p. 214]. What else
could Margetts believe but that he represented and was speaking for American?
1. Snow had actual authority to bind American.
The principle of agency that governs here was stated in Kline v. MultiMedia
Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 666 P.2d 711 (1983), in which the court answered a question
certified to it by a federal court as to when a corporation is liable for punitive damages for
the wrongful acts of its agent. As a preliminary matter the court set forth these two wellestablished legal principles, at 713:
First, a corporation is liable for the torts of its agent when
committed within the scope of the agent's authority and course of
employment even though it did not authorize or ratify the tortious
acts Russell v. American Rock Crusher Co., 181 Kan. 891, 894, 317
P.2d 847 (1957). A related rule of law states a principal is
responsible for the torts of its agent where the tortious acts are
incidental to and in furtherance of the principal's business, even
though outside the scope of the agent's authority. Williams v.
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Community Drive-In Theater, Inc., 214 Kan. 359, 520 P.2d 1296
(1974).
If those principles apply to the wrongful acts of the agent, they also apply to acts
which are not wrongful but are performed to carry out the purposes of the corporation, as
was the case here. See Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 524 P.2d 271 (Alaska, 1974), where
the court held that an attorney retained to negotiate the terms of an agreement binds his
client to promises made within the scope of that authority although not authorized. And,
even though New West now claims Snow had no authority to act for its predecessor, he was
clearly authorized by American to prepare and obtain the signature of Margetts on the
settlement agreements and it is bound by the acts of Snow which are "incidental to and in
furtherance of that object "even though outside the scope of his authority.
Utah cases also hold that a party, including the State, is bound by the acts of
attorneys which it places in a position where others will rely on those acts. Gorgoza, Inc.
v. Utah State Road Commission, 553 P.2d 413 (Utah 1976), held that the State was bound
by an agreement entered into by its attorney which obligated the State to provide access to
property which the State had not authorized. The court went on, at 415, to point out that
the state
proceeded to act pursuant to the agreement and in accordance with
the benefit it received therefrom, so there is at least some plausibility
to the idea that it should be deemed to have ratified and/or to be
estopped from repudiating that contract.
In a suit brought by the payee of a usurious promissory note against both the
makers of the note and the attorney who was retained by the makers to draft the note, the
court in Silver v. George, 618 P.2d 1157 (Haw. App. 1980), held the makers and the attorney
liable for the damage caused in these words, at 1159:

my

We hold that it is a per se violation of an attorney's duty for him to
draw a note, which is on its face usurious, that that duty runs at least
to the named parties to the note, including the payee, even though
the payee did not hire him or pay his fee; that the attorney is the
agent for his clients in drawing the note; and that his clients should
not be permitted to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the payee
when the attorney draws a note which violates the law and thus
confers a benefit upon his client at the expense of the relying and
innocent payee.
While the terms of the agreements themselves, in our case, did not violate the
law, Margetts innocently relied upon the attorney hired by American to draft those
agreements and it should not be permitted to be unjustly enriched at the expense of
Margetts by taking advantage of the benefit conferred upon it by the actions and
representations of that attorney.
That American was directly involved in the whole process through Snow and was
well aware of the benefit it was to receive from the transaction with Margetts is clear from
the testimony of Snow. He testified as follows:
If it wasn't satisfactory to American, then the deal wouldn't go
through; so I had to run the documents past American. [R. 538, p.
83].
And then, in my sending documents back and forth to Roulhac Garn,
it was clarified what documents were needed and what the form of
those documents would have to be.
Q. But, did you talk to Roulhac Garn about that?
A. Yes.
Q. And did she indicate they were mandatory, that those
documents be signed by Jack Margetts?
A. She indicated that it was mandatory that Jack Margetts,
along with all the other lienholders, reconvey their interest in the
project. [R. 538, pp. 102-3].
Q. That intent was communicated to you by someone at
American?
A. Yes. [R. 538, p. 113].
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. . . did American at any time inform you that they were willing
to pay your fee in part because the work that you were doing was of
substantial benefit to American?
A. Yes. [R. 538, p. 117].
Q. So, when you drafted it, revised it, prepared it, negotiated
about it [referring to Exhibit 7], that was solely for American
Savings, is that correct?
A. Yes. [R. 538, p. 123].
Question: [Referring to the Twenty Percent Agreement] After
preparing this, did you discuss this agreement with American?
Answer: Probably.
A. Yes. As far as it goes in context, yes.
Q. Is that what you said?
A. Yes. [R. 538, p. 133].
Even Roulhac Garn, American's San Francisco attorney, who disingenuously denied that
Snow was American's Salt Lake attorney, admitted the benefit to American of Snow's work:
Q. Did it prove, also, of value to American Savings?
A. I don't know, The transaction wouldn't have closed without
these agreements.
Q. It was vital then, was it not, that all of these documents be
signed?
A. Yes.
Q. And they were all required by the deed-in-lieu agreement
that you prepared?
A. Yes. [R. 539, p. 311].
American wanted to obtain a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and a release of all liens against the
property. It paid Snow to accomplish that. Snow succeeded in accomplishing that only by
making representations to Margetts which induced him to sign the agreements and release
his lien against the property. American received the benefit of that release.

T

ew West, as

American's successor, has accepted that benefit but now refuses to ret

nize the

representations made by the agent who obtained that benefit. If the principles oi actual or
apparent authority do not bind New West to those representations, then the principles of
ratification and estoppel by acceptance of the benefits obtained by those representations do.
1A

In making its supplemental finding that Snow did not have actual authority to
bind American, the lower court ignored all of the following evidence of actual authority:
(a) By paragraph 3 of the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Agreement, Terrace
Falls and American agreed to cooperate in obtaining releases of liens [Exh. 4, R. 538, p. 48].
(b) American agreed to compromise the creditor's claims [Exh. 4, H l.F] and pay
the amounts required to obtain releases [Exh. 4, If 4.E, R. 538, p. 49]. That required that
American authorize the amount to be paid, since Terrace Falls was not given a blank check.
(c) Snow was authorized by American to negotiate the lien claims [R. 538, p.55].
(d) Snow was paid for his services by American [R. 538, pp. 56, 98] and
American considered his services to be of substantial benefit to American [R. 538, p. 117].
(e) The intent of American was communicated directly by American to Snow
and not through others [R. 538, p. 113] and it was American that requested Snow to arrange
a meeting with the junior lienholders [R. 538, p. 57, Exh. 5].
(f) At the first meeting with a representative of American, on September 12,
1984, it was Snow who did the talking and it was Snow who made the offer to Margetts [R.
539, pp. 204, 264-5]. Kirton & McConkie played no part in that meeting [R. 538, p. 115].
(g) It was clear that the offer was being made on behalf of American who was
furnishing the money to make the offer [R. 538, p. 61].
(h) American authorized an increase in the offer to $50,000 [R. 538, p. 62].
(i) After September 12,1984, all dealings between American and Margetts were
conducted through Snow and Kirton & McConkie was not involved [R. 538, pp. 100-1].
(j) Snow, on behalf of American, communicated the increase in the offer to
Margetts [R. 538, p. 62, R. 539, p. 265].
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(k) American authorized an offer of $150,000 credit to Margetts towards the
purchase of a condominium [R. 538, pp. 63-4].
(1) Snow, on behalf of American, communicated this credit offer to Margetts [R.
538, p. 63, R. 539, p. 265].
(m) Snow prepared the documents for American, presented them to Margetts
and revised those documents at the request of Margetts [R. 538, pp. 53, 65, R. 539, p. 270].
(n) The documents were reviewed by American and approved by it and Snow
had the approval of American for all that he was doing [R. 538, pp. 82-3, 102-3].
The only evidence that Snow did not represent American was the denial that he
represented American by Snow and American, both made after the fact. Snow did not make
any statements to Margetts or his attorney in the Fall of 1984 as to whom he was
representing [R. 538, p. Ill] so all conclusions as to whom he was representing must be
based on actions or other statements made. New West claims that the fact that Snow
represented Terrace Falls and that Kirton & McConkie represented American is evidence
that Snow did not represent American. It is irrelevant that American may have been
represented by other attorneys or that Snow may also have represented Terrace Falls. He
could and did represent both American and Terrace Falls in obtaining the releases. Even
if Snow and American said he did not represent American, that does not change the fact
that he did so by taking instructions directly from American, conveying those in? mictions to
Margetts and conveying Margetts' responses back to American, preparing the doct
American, delivering those to American and by American accepting those docum

a

,nts for
s and

paying Snow his fees incurred in doing so. American gave Snow authority to act ft it and
it is, therefore, bound by anything he did in carrying out American's directions to obtain a
release from Margetts.
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Whenever the performance of certain business is confided to an
agent, such authority carries with it, by implication, authority to do
collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the
main act or business authorized. Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862, 864
(Utah 1978).
This authority applies even to acts of the agent which were not authorized by the principal
so long as they are within the scope of the agent's employment. See Kline v. Multi-Media
Cablevision, Inc.: Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., supra, at 21-22. Therefore, what Margetts
knew about that authority and the facts which relate only to the question of apparent
authority are superfluous. Snow had actual authority to act for American and it is bound
by his representations made to Margetts in obtaining from him the release that he had been
authorized to obtain.
2. Snow had apparent authority to bind American.
The superfluous facts referred to above are sufficient to establish that Mr. Snow
had apparent authority, in addition to his actual authority, to act for and to bind American.
In Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980), the referral by a seller to her
attorney of a letter written to her by the buyers was held to be sufficient to clothe the
attorney with apparent authority to act for the seller. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones,
672 P.2d 73, 74 (Utah 1983), also upheld the principle of apparent authority and stated the
rule of law as follows:
Apparent authority exists: ,f[W]here a person has created such an
appearance of things that it causes a third party reasonably and
prudently to believe that a second party has the power to act on
behalf of the first person . . . ." Wynn v. McMahon Ford Co., 414
S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. App. 1967).
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From the very first meeting of the parties every statement on behalf of American, every
offer made by American, every document relating to the transaction and every
communication back to American from Margetts was made by or passed through Snow.
This was true even when American's admitted agent, Mr. Lee Stevens, was present. Snow
spoke for him and relayed Margetts' responses back to him. American clearly "created such
an appearance of things that it caused" Margetts "reasonably and prudently to believe that"
Snow had "the power to act on behalf of American. New West is, therefore, bound by the
acts of its predecessor's agent, including the representations made by that agent as to the
effect of the total agreement.
This principle has also been held to apply to the acts of an attorney who did not
actually represent the party bound by those acts. In Arizona Title Ins. and Trust Co. v.
Pace, 8 Ariz. App. 269, 445 P.2d 471 (1968), a title insurance company retained an attorney
to defend its insured on a claim on which it had denied coverage. The attorney settled the
claim for $4,750.00 which the insured paid. The insured then sued the title insurance
company to recover the amount paid to settle. The question presented to the court was
whether the insurance company was bound by the settlement entered into by the insured's
attorney, who was hired and paid by the insurer. The court held, at 473-4:
However, if the client places the attorney in a position where third
persons of ordinary prudence and discretion would be justified in
assuming the attorney was acting within his authority, then the client
is bound by the acts of the attorney within the scope of his appa *nt
authority . . . .
. . . . The appellant retained an attorney who, although named as ai
attorney of record for the defendants-insured, was primarily involved
in the litigation to protect the interests of the insurer. The attorney
regularly advised the insurer, through its managing agent, of the
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progress of the litigation. The insurer was fully aware of the fact
that the appellees construed Ellis's representation of them to be
nominal only and that Ellis was acting for the insurer. Therefore,
when Ellis advised compromise of the Bailey's claim and volunteered
to effect it on behalf of the appellees, they were justified in assuming
that he had authority to do so. Under such circumstances, appellant
is estopped to assert otherwise and is thereby bound by the act of its
attorney.
Here we have a similar situation where Snow nominally represented Terrace
Falls but was paid by, gave advice to and took direction from American. The only difference
was that Margetts was on the other side of the matter and would be less likely to know of
any lack of authority of Snow to act for American. Our case is, therefore, a stronger one
for holding that Snow had apparent authority to act for American and that Margetts was
justified in assuming he had authority.
D. New West is bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement as the
successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls.
New West has suggested that the purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement was
to allow Margetts to participate in any windfall or kickback that might be paid to Terrace
Falls after the deed-in-lieu to American. This suggestion makes no sense since Terrace Falls
was conveying its entire interest in the project and retained no rights to receive anything
back from American. [Exh. 4, 1IH 2, 8.A]. And, of course, anything that might have gone
to Terrace Falls in the form of a kickback would not be made known to Margetts. There
was no reason for him to expect anything from Terrace Falls. The Twenty Percent
Agreement was totally valueless if the credit to Margetts under the Agreement was to come
from Terrace Falls, the partnership which owned the project prior to its conveyance to
American. It would not be selling any condominium units nor would it receive anything from
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the sale of condominium units. If that were the purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement
it would be totally illusory and Margetts surely would not have released his lien and signed
the other agreements in return for such an illusory expectation. Nor would American expect
him to do so, knowing of his refusal for two months to accept what they had already
proposed. In other words, it was totally unreasonable for both parties to interpret the
Twenty Percent Agreement to give Margetts a percentage of what Terrace Falls might get
in the future, which every body knew would be nothing. Margetts would not give up his
bargaining position for nothing and American knew he would not.
Furthermore, why would the assignment to Margetts be limited to $134,283.00,
the price to be paid by Margetts under the Condominium Purchase Agreement with
American [Exh. 7], if that agreement was not part of the whole transaction with American.
There would be no reason to limit his participation with Terrace Falls to that figure since
Terrace Falls owed Margetts over $300,000.00 [Exh. 2, If 2(a) and (b)].
Therefore, the only interpretation of the Twenty Percent Agreement that makes
any sense is that it was American who was agreeing to credit Margetts, up to $134,283.00,
the stated purchase price of his unit, for 20% of "any proceeds from the sale of the Project
or of any unit or interest therein" [Exh. 10 and 16]. For this reason Margetts' testimony as
to what Snow told him about the agreement is entirely credible and the only version of the
conversation that is credible:
Q. After Mr. Snow had presented you with the 20-Percent
Agreement, Exhibit 16, did he say anything to you?
A. Yes. He said, "Do you realize that they only have to sell
seven condominiums and your condominium will be paid for?"
Q

Did you make any response to that?
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A. He made an explanation that I would get what I wanted by
such an agreement.
Q. Did you ask him anything about that agreement, yourself?
A. Yes. I asked him why American Savings wasn't signing it.
Q. Did he respond?
A. Yes. He said, "They didn't need to." He said, "With the
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, they will be Terrace Falls
Condominiums."3
Q. Now, did you believe what he told you?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And did you rely on it?
A. I relied on it. [R. 539, pp. 212-4].
That is the only interpretation of this agreement that makes any sense. American took
advantage of that interpretation when it encouraged Margetts to find buyers of units in the
project and actually sold five condominiums as a result of that [R. 539, p. 230].
Irrespective of whether Snow actually told Margetts that American would be
Terrace Falls and would be bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement, the fact is that
American, by the terms of the Real Property Purchase Agreement, did become Terrace Falls
Condominiums and New West is still operating the project under that name. That Real
Property Purchase Agreement provides that the "Owner", Terrace Falls Condominiums,
"shall sell, grant, and convey to American" the real and personal property of the project and
the business of selling or leasing units, or the ownership or rental of
condominiums, or in connection with the use thereof, including but
not limited to: (i) all of Owner's right, title, and interest in the
Property as Developer/Declarant; (ii) all trade styles or names used
in connection with the same, including but not limited to, the name
"Terrace Falls":... (xii) any other rights of Owner . . . in connection
with the Property; [Exh. 4, H2.B] (emphasis supplied).

3. It should be noted that this is not the kind of response a layman would makeup or a concept that a layman would understand. It is the kind of language that would come
from an attorney. Margetts' version of this conversation is by far more credible than Snow's.
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Thus, American stepped into the shoes of Terrace Falls and took over the obligation to
complete the project and to pay the bills incurred in owning, operating and selling the
project. It inherited the burdens and benefits of the project including the obligation to credit
Margetts for 20% of the proceeds of sales in the project. American, as the owner and the
seller of units, was the only party with any ability to perform the Twenty Percent Agreement.
E, New West is obligated to Margetts as a third party beneficiary
of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement.
Even if the Twenty Percent Agreement is considered to have been made by
Terrace Falls, American, as the purchaser of the project from Terrace Falls, with knowledge
of the obligation to Margetts through Snow, who informed American of the agreement
(whether or not he is its agent), is obligated to Margetts as a third party beneficiary of the
Real Property Purchase and Sale Agreement. Mullins v. Evans, 560 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah
1977). By paragraph 4.E of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement, American agreed to pay
all sums required of it by the Settlement Agreements, including the agreement with
Margetts. That Settlement Agreement is between Terrace Falls and Margetts. Since the
Twenty Percent Agreement is also between Terrace Falls and Margetts and they must be
construed together as one agreement (See Point II.A above), the Twenty Percent Agreement
is part of that Settlement Agreement. American has therefore agreed, by paragraph 4.E of
the Real Estate Purchase Agreement, to pay all amounts due Margetts under the Twenty
Percent Agreement. Margetts is an intended third party beneficiary of that agre, ment.
This transaction is similar to a bulk sale in which Terrace Falls sold its inventory
of condominium units to American. Comparison to the bulk sales law is instructive since the
purpose of that is to make sure that all outstanding obligations of the seller are paid or
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provided for in the sale of the assets from which claimants would otherwise be paid.
American and Terrace Falls did make provision for the payment of such obligations in the
Real Property Purchase Agreement, as stated above, wherein they agreed to cooperate in
obtaining the release of liens and American agreed to pay all sums required to be paid in
connection with the obtaining of such releases. Thus, by its own contract, American agreed
to pay what was required to obtain a release from Margetts and Margetts is the beneficiary
of that contract. New West has now stepped into the shoes of American and is likewise
bound to honor the commitments made to and for the benefit of Margetts.
POINT III
MARGETTS WAS INDUCED TO ENTER INTO THE
AGREEMENTS WITH AMERICAN AND TO RELEASE HIS LIEN
BY IMPROPER CONDUCT, WHETHER TERMED FRAUD,
DURESS, COERCION, MISTAKE,
NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION, UNCONSCIONABILITY, OR UNFAIR
DEALING AND IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OR DAMAGES.
If it is determined that the Twenty Percent Agreement is not binding on New
West, then the facts recited above clearly demonstrate that Margetts was induced to sign the
agreements and release his lien because of the representations made to him by Snow. He
would not have done so except for his reliance upon those representations which turned out
to be false and were known by Snow to have been false. All of the elements of fraud are
present including false, material representations made knowingly or recklessly, justifiable
reliance, inducement and damage. Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952).
The elements of negligent misrepresentation are also present, including pecuniary interest
in the transaction, superior position to know the facts, careless or negligent false
representation expecting reliance and reasonable reliance and damage. Christenson v. Com.
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Land Title Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983). Duress and coercion are also present. Reliable
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins., 16 U.2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965). Since
Margetts perception of the agreement was an essential element of the contract and it is
unconscionable to enforce the contract against him without honoring what he thought he was
getting, unilateral mistake also provides grounds for relief. John Call Engineering v. Manti
City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987); B & A Associates v. L. A. Young Sons Const. Co.,
796 P.2d 692 (Utah 1990). Because Margetts gave up his entire interest in the project in
return for what was an illusory promise, the agreement is unconscionable and should be
rescinded or reformed. Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc.,
706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983).
Any one or all of these principles have application in this case and entitle
Margetts to rescission of the transaction and reinstatement of his lien or, in the alternative,
to damages for what he has lost as a result. What he has lost is the $200,000.00, plus
interest, which was secured by his lien on the project. In any event the judgment against him
in this case cannot be justified in light of the unfair dealing that has occurred in this matter.
POINT IV
IF THE CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS NOT
ENFORCED IN MARGETTS' FAVOR, HE IS ENTITLED TO A
JUDGMENT FOR THE PAYMENTS MADE OR CREDIT GIVEN
BASED ON UNCONSCIONABLE FORFEITURE.
This Court's remand order required the lower court to clarify why boti
and rent were awarded and to explore the "question of whether Margetts forfc
$150,000 credit."

rfeiture
d his

Although the lower court recognized some merit in the arguments

presented by counsel on this point, it failed to make any findings on this issue and felt that
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this Court was perhaps confused. The crucial nature of this point is apparent when one
considers that Margetts went into this trial with credit for a $150,000 payment (reduced from
the $300,000 plus originally owed to him) on a contract to purchase the condominium and
came out with no condominium and a judgment against him totalling $52,546.00! One must
ask what in the world he did to suffer a loss of more than $200,000.00! The question of
unconscionable forfeiture must be dealt with and the lower court refused to do so.
Instead of concluding that a forfeiture had occurred, the lower court concluded
that Margetts repudiated the Condominium Purchase Agreement [R. 861, If C.l]. This
conclusion was not based on any finding of fact and was contrary to all of the facts. Indeed,
Margetts was attempting to enforce that agreement by asking the Court to order New West
to convey the condominium to him. His payment under the agreement was represented by
the $150,000 credit and the credit for twenty percent of the sales proceeds of the other
condominiums pursuant to the Twenty Percent Agreement. After having determined that
Margetts was not entitled to the credit under the Twenty Percent Agreement, the lower
court erred in concluding that Margetts breached or repudiated the Condominium Purchase
Agreement because New West was not attempting to enforce that agreement. If it had sued
for breach of the agreement, its remedies would have been specific performance, rescission
of the agreement or damages for breach. It expressly abandoned any attempt to enforce
performance when objection was made to evidence as to rental value of the property. New
West's attorney stated, "We are not seeking $134,000.00. That would amount to specific
performance" [R. 538, p. 154, lines 12-13], thus electing to forego any claim under the
purchase agreement and electing to pursue only a claim for occupancy. He confirmed this
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in his closing argument when he said, "the primary relief that we seek is . . . restitution or
possession of the unit" [R. 539, p. 334, lines 4-6] and "we have elected to merely~to proceed
merely on a theory of the fair rental value of the property" [R. 539 p. 335, lines 6-8]. New
West did not seek rescission of the agreement because it would have had to restore Margetts
to the status quo ante and it did not prove any damages for breach of the agreement. It
sought only damages for unlawful detainer, which had nothing to do with the purchase
agreement. No remedies were sought under that agreement. The termination of the
purchase agreement for failure of Margetts to pay what was due raises the question of an
unconscionable forfeiture of the $150,000.00 credit.
There is a long line of cases in the State of Utah which refuses to allow the seller
of real property, after termination of the sales contract for default by the buyer, to retain
all amounts received by the seller (including credits to the buyer) if those amounts do not
bear a reasonable relationship to the seller's actual damages. Unconscionable forfeiture is
the legal theory behind these cases. Each of these cases compares the total amount
forfeited by the buyer to the seller's actual damages and determines if there is a reasonable
relationship between the two. For example, Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983) held
that "liquidated damages of $20,725 do not bear a reasonable relationship to $5,895 actual
damages." The Court ordered the difference of $14,830 returned to the buyer. Allen v.
Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986), held that liquidated damages of $10,800 d

not bear

a reasonable relationship to actual damages of $3,746 and ordered the difference c $7,054
returned to the buyer. Johnson v. Carmen, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977), held that liq, lated
damages of $34,596 did not bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages of $25/ 0 and
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ordered the difference of $8,845 returned to the buyer. Jacobsen v. Swan, 3 U.2d 59, 278
P.2d 294 (1954), held that liquidated damages of $5,060 did not bear a reasonable
relationship to actual damages of $1,870 and ordered the difference of $3,190 returned to
the buyer. Morris v. Svkes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981), held that liquidated damages of
$23,216 did not bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages of $9,095 and ordered the
difference of $14,121 returned to the buyer. More recently, Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1097
(Utah 1991), held that liquidated damages of $76,190.36 did not bear a reasonable
relationship to actual damages of $50,132.03 and ordered the difference of $26,058.33
returned to the buyer. In this case the liquidated damages of New West amount to $159,234,
consisting of the $150,000 credit for which Margetts gave up his lien and the $9,234 he paid
to finish his unit. Actual damages are $17,100, consisting of the rental value during Margetts
occupancy.

Based on the standard of the foregoing cases, these are grossly and

unconscionably disproportionate and the Court should order payment of the difference of
$142,134 to Margetts. Termination of the contract is an unconscionable forfeiture of that
contract and New West has taken that condominium from Margetts. Margetts is entitled
to a return of the excess of what he has paid over and above New West's actual damages.
The lower court somehow concluded that Margetts was not entitled to judgment
for forfeiture of the $150,000 credit because American did not receive the $150,000. This,
of course, was simply a failure to recognize what happened. Margetts had given up his Park
City condominium which had been valued by the parties at $200,000 and was to receive
interest thereon at 15% per annum, making over $300,000 at the time of the transaction with
American. American was willing to give Margetts a credit of $150,000 on the purchase of
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a condominium in return for the benefits it would receive from the transaction. Those
benefits were substantial and were worth a great deal more than $150,000. In addition to
retaining $2,476,000 it still held in its loan to Terrace Falls, it wanted to "avoid [the] negative
publicity" of a foreclosure that "always puts a negative cloud on the project, makes marketing
more difficult" because of other "highly visible" projects in the area that had been foreclosed.
It further wanted "to have a smooth transition, and to all outward appearances, the public
would not be aware that there were any particular difficulties on the project and it "also
wanted the quickness and the ease of the deed-in-lieu proceeding". It also wanted to avoid
a possible "Chapter 11 type bankruptcy" proceeding which could delay foreclosure for
months and perhaps years. These were all described as "advantages to American." [R. 539,
p. 41]. In return for these advantages, American was willing to pay cash of over $88,000
[Exh. 1-5 to Exh.4] and grant credits of $414,000 [Exh. 6 and 7 to Exh. 4] to lienholders,
including the $150,000 credit to Margetts. To conclude that American did not receive the
$150,000 from Margetts is totally erroneous. American received substantial value and
Margetts parted with substantial value which both parties agreed was $159,234, including the
$9,234 Margetts paid to complete his condominium. To take this away from Margetts and
to enter a $52,000 judgment against him is unconscionable and is contrary to the law
established by the foregoing and other cases. Margetts is entitled to have judgment entered
in his favor in the amount of $142,134.
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POINT V
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST MARGETTS FOR THE FAIR
RENTAL VALUE OF THE UNIT IN THE AMOUNT OF $17,100
WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OR THE FINDINGS
OF FACT AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
The lower court entered judgment against Margetts for rent for nineteen months
based on what the court determined the fair rental value to be. This judgment was obviously
not based on any rental agreement between Margetts and New West. In fact, the court
found that no such agreement existed [R. 515, If 16]. The evidence fully supports this since
Roulhac Garn did not prepare an occupancy agreement for Margetts [R. 539, p. 305] and
since no one ever asked Margetts to pay any homeowner's fees or rent [R. 539, p. 235] and
in fact refused his offer to pay homeowners' fees [R. 539, p. 233]. How can the court
conclude that Margetts owes rent without an agreement to pay rent? There must be a
factual and legal basis for such a conclusion.
The only possible legal basis for such a conclusion would be unjust enrichment,
which requires that (1) a benefit be conferred on one person by another, (2) an appreciation
or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit, and (3) the acceptance or retention by the
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee
to retain the benefit without payment of its value. Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake
County, 734 P.2d 910 (Utah 1987); Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984). There
was no unjust enrichment in those cases even though a benefit was conferred on one party.
In our case there are no facts to establish these essential elements. The court actually found
that both parties benefited from Margetts' occupancy [R. 515, II 16]. American dismissed
its security personnel because of Margetts' presence on the project and, in addition, several
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sales of units were made as a direct result of his presence there [R. 515, 1111 18 and 19; R.
539, p. 230]. That represents a substantial benefit to American which would exceed any
rental value of the unit and, in light of that, it cannot be concluded that it would be
inequitable for Margetts to retain any benefit he may have received. The court, of course,
made no such finding. Furthermore, New West lost no revenue because of Margetts'
occupancy since only three units in the entire project were rented out [R. 538, p. 151, 161-2].
The rest of the complex was essentially vacant. But, most importantly, Margetts lost the
condominium in which he had a contribution of $159,234, which was turned over to New
West for nothing. That tremendous benefit to New West must be offset against any benefit
to Margetts or that loss to Margetts must be offset against any benefit he may have received.
The net effect is that Margetts received no benefit from the transaction at all. The
principles of unjust enrichment simply do not exist. Furthermore, Karapanos v. Boardwalk
Fries, Inc., 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah 1992), held that "recovery for quantum meruit
presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists." The existence of the
Condominium Purchase Agreement, which New West elected not to enforce, precludes any
application of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, there is no basis for an award of rent and
the judgment for rent must be reversed.
POINT VI
THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR $21,600
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS NOR THE LAW.
New West did not comply with the unlawful detainer statute and there is no

sis

for a judgment for unlawful detainer. The basis for the claim of unlawful detainer was the
Notice to Quit on March 25, 1989. The section of the Unlawful Detainer Statute relied
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upon by New West as the basis for this claim is §78-36-3, U.C.A. The only provision that
could apply to this case is §78-36-3 (l)(b)(ii) which provides:
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of
an unlawful detainer
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite term with
monthly or other periodic rent reserved:
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in
possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less
than five days;
To come within this provision the tenant must have leased the property "for an indefinite
term with monthly or other periodic rent reserved." The next subparagraph does not apply
unless the property is leased with periodic rent reserved and then the tenancy is converted
to a tenancy-at-will. Since the clause having to do with tenancies at will is a subdivision of
subparagraph (b), there must have been a lease of the property "for an indefinite time with
monthly or other periodic rent reserved" before the subdivision on tenancies at will applies.
Otherwise, that subdivision would have been listed by itself as subparagraph (c), or some
other letter designation. This does not leave New West without a remedy since it always had
the non-summary remedies that existed at common law prior to and after the adoption of
the Unlawful Detainer Statute. American Holding Co., 23 U.2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (Utah
1970), at 593-5 (concurring opinion). In this case there was no lease and no rent of any kind
reserved. There was simply no basis for unlawful detainer.
As stated in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952),
"unlawful detainer, being a summary procedure, the statute must be strictly complied with
in order to enforce the obligations imposed by it." New West has not complied with the
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requirements of §78-36-3 in order to place Margetts in unlawful detainer of the
condominium unit. Furthermore, it has not complied with §78-36-6 which provides:
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served:
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail
addressed to the tenant at his place of residence;
(3) If he is absent from his place of residence or from his usual
place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and
discretion at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the
address of his place of residence or place of business; or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at
the place of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place
on the leased property.
The evidence in this case was that the Notice to Quit was mailed to Margetts [R. 538, pp.
177-8] but there was no evidence that it was sent by registered or certified mail as required
by the statute. Strict compliance with that statute is the essence of an unlawful detainer
action and the burden is on New West to prove that it has fully complied. That applies to
the form of the notice, American Holding Co. v. Hanson, supra, as well as to the service of
the notice, Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (Utah 1944). In Carstensen,
the mailing of a notice to quit was held to be insufficient because it did not comply with the
statute. The court stated, at 955:
There could be no need to detail certain explicit methods of service
if any method will do. . . . "Under statutes like this, it is not the fact
that the party to be notified has actual knowledge of the fact, but it
is proof that it has been conveyed to him in the prescribed method,
that gives right of action. . . . The statutory method, once broken
through, would open wide the gates for vicious precedents, which
rapidly multiply, and too often, in the end, practically nullify the will
of the legislature." [quoting Hyde v. Goldsby, 25 Mo. App. 29]
Since the decision in that case, the statute has been amended to allow

**vice

of the notice by registered or certified mail, §78-36-6(2), U.C.A., but not by reguL mail.
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New West has not met its burden of proof to show that it is entitled to proceed under the
Unlawful Detainer Statute. Service by regular mail and actual notice by any method, other
than those prescribed by the statute, is simply not sufficient to place one in unlawful
detainer. Other remedies were available to New West to obtain possession of the property
without the necessity of following the strict requirements of the Unlawful Detainer Statute,
but if it wants the benefits of the summary procedure, it must follow the steps outlined
therein. American Holding Co., supra at 593-5 (concurring opinion).
Likewise, New West's failure to serve Mrs. Margetts with a notice to quit is fatal
to its claim for damages for unlawful detainer. The statute requires that the notice be
served in one of the four ways listed in §78-36-6, U.C.A. Mrs. Margetts was not served with
a notice at all, let alone in one of the ways prescribed by the statute. This same situation
arose in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, 449 (1952), in which the wife was
served but the husband was not. The court held:
Unlawful detainer, being a summary procedure, the statute must be
strictly complied with in order to enforce the obligations imposed by
it. The trial court correctly ruled that the action for unlawful
detainer could not be maintained against Mr. Perkins. . . .
. . . . So long as he remained in possession, it is difficult to see how
the Spencers could be damaged by the fact that Mrs. Perkins
remained there. Even if she had moved, Spencers would have had
no right to possession of the premises as against Mr. Perkins. They,
therefore, suffered no actual damage. In Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah
137, 292 P. 206, 211, we held that "The damages which may be
recovered in an action such as this one (unlawful detainer) are
measured by the rule that they must be the natural and proximate
consequences of the acts complained of and nothing more." Nominal
damages to vindicate their right to possession against her is all that
could properly by awarded.
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The court in Perkins came to this conclusion even though Mr. Perkins was working in
another county and may not have been actually residing in the home at the time of service
on Mrs. Perkins. Because there was no proof that he had abandoned the home or that the
marriage was not intact, it was presumed that Mr. Perkins was occupying the home. The
Margetts case is, therefore, a stronger one for holding that no more than nominal damages
could be recovered. Furthermore, even if Mrs. Margetts had been properly served with the
notice, she was not joined as a party to the action. No judgment could be effective against
her. New West has suffered no damages as a result of Margetts' occupancy of the property.
The severe remedy of the unlawful detainer statute requires strict compliance
with all of its terms before judgment thereunder is appropriate. American Holding Co. v.
Hanson, supra: Van Zwerden v. Farrar, 15 U.2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). New West was
simply not in a position to sue under the Unlawful Detainer Statute.
POINT VII
THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IS NOT BASED
ON ANY STATUTE, AGREEMENT NOR EVIDENCE.
Any award of attorney's fees must be based on either a statute or an
agreement which authorizes such fees. Not even a stipulation will support such an award.
Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979). The only statute involved in this case is the
Unlawful Detainer Statute which provides, in §78-36-10(3), U.C.A., for the award of
attorney's fees only "if they are provided for in the lease or agreement."

"he "lease or

agreement" is defined under §78-36-10(1) as "the lease or agreement und

'hich the

property was held. New West's own attorney admitted that she prepared nc

jcupancy

agreement [R. 539, p. 305].
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The Condominium Purchase Agreement does not provide for fees in this case.
In the first place that agreement only provides for fees in a dispute arising "under this
Agreement," which is not the agreement under which Margetts held the property. In the
second place, New West did not obtain a judgment based on a claim or dispute under that
agreement. In fact, it abandoned its claim under that agreement when it sought a judgment
only for Margetts' occupancy of the property. When objection was made to evidence as to
rental value because of the claim to enforce the agreement, New West's attorney stated, "We
are not seeking $134,000.00. That would amount to specific performance" [R. 538, p. 154],
thus electing to forego the claim under the purchase agreement and electing to pursue only
a claim for occupancy. He confirmed this in his closing argument when he said, "the primary
relief that we seek is . . . restitution or possession of the unit" [R. 539, p. 334] and "we have
elected to merely-to proceed merely on a theory of the fair rental value of the property"
[R. 539, p. 335]. Consistent with that position, the lower court only awarded judgment based
on Margetts' occupancy of the property.
Utah cases have held that one may not "avoid the contract and, at the same time,
claim the benefit of the provision for attorney's fees." BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, 586
P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 1978). The abandonment of the claim under the agreement is an
avoidance of the agreement. Similarly, Cluff v. Culmer. 556 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1976), held:
However, this court has numerous times said that such a provision
for attorney's fees makes them allowable only for enforcement of the
covenants in the contract. Therefore, it does not extend to implied
covenants or obligations not expressly included therein. It follows
that the trial court correctly ruled that attorney's fees claimed by the
plaintiffs are not allowable.
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See also Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 329 (Utah App. 1990) (fees cannot be awarded
under a contract when the dispute does not relate to a breach or dispute under the
contract). Since New West was not enforcing any covenant in the purchase agreement, it
cannot rely on the attorney's fee provision of that agreement. There is, therefore, no basis
for the award of attorney's fees.
Furthermore, Cluff v. Oilmen supra at 499, went on to state:
When attorney's fees are properly awardable, they must be proved
as any other damages; either by stipulation that the court may
determine them from his own knowledge and experience, or there
must be evidence upon which to base a finding as to their necessity
and reasonableness.
There is neither a stipulation nor evidence in this case from which a finding of necessity and
reasonableness can be made. That is a further ground upon which the award of attorney's
fees must be overturned.
Most importantly, the dispute in this case is not under the Condominium
Purchase Agreement but is under the total agreement, including the Twenty Percent
Agreement.

In fact, since New West claims it is not bound by the Twenty Percent

Agreement, the entire dispute is really over whether or not the Twenty Percent Agreement
applies.

It would, therefore, be totally inconsistent to hold that the Twenty Percent

Agreement does not apply and then award attorney's fees under a separate agreement that
is not in dispute. Conversely, if fees are to be awarded under the Condominium Purchase
Agreement, because there is a dispute under that agreement, then the Twenty Percent
Agreement must be a part of that agreement since that is the basis of the entire dispute.
It would follow that Margetts must prevail on his claim that all of the documents must be
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read together as one agreement binding on American, and the award of attorney's fees must
be made to Margetts. That, of course, is what the court ought to order in this case but,
short of that, a judgment for attorney's fees in favor of New West cannot stand.
POINT VIII
THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW SINCE THE DAMAGES COULD NOT BE
CALCULATED PRECISELY AND WERE FOR THE TRIER-OFFACT TO DETERMINE.
Prejudgment interest is allowable, according to Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins,
Brown and Gunnell 784 P.2d 475, at 483 (Utah App. 1989), only when the damages can be
calculated with mathematical certainty
in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount,
rather than be guided by their best judgment . . . .
On the other hand, interest cannot be allowed in cases 'where
damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the
jury to assess at the time of trial' . . . . In particular, damages
ascertained by determining the fair market value of real property
before and after the damage 'cannot be determined with
mathematical precision [and] may be inherently uncertain.'
The determination of rental value of real property is in the same category since that is in
the province of the trier-of-fact to be determined from the testimony of experts. Therefore,
as in Price-Orem, prejudgment interest cannot be awarded. This principle was reaffirmed
in Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992) which
also held that prejudgment interest could not be awarded in a case for the equitable relief
of unjust enrichment, which could be the only legal basis for the award of rent in this case.
Likewise, the addition of prejudgment interest on the entire judgment amount included in
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the new judgment entered January 11, 1993, was in error. Like rental value, treble damages
for unlawful detainer and attorney's fees are not subject to calculation in advance by
mathematical certainty and cannot support prejudgment interest. That portion of the
judgment, too, must be overturned.
CONCLUSION
This dispute is over the entire agreement between the parties, which includes the
Twenty Percent Agreement. All of the documents must be upheld, or rescinded, together
and Margetts' lien be reinstated or he be given credit against the price of his unit for twenty
percent of the proceeds of sales of other units. Margetts is on one side of the transaction
and New West and Terrace Falls stand together on the other side, each bound by the other's
promises, both having received and accepted the benefits of Margetts' agreement.
The inconsistencies and ambiguities among those documents allow the
consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret them and require that the entire agreement
be held unenforceable unless Margetts' view of those documents, as represented to him by
Snow, be adopted. That is the only view that makes any sense under the circumstances.
Snow was authorized directly by American to negotiate for a release from
Margetts. American gave Snow directions, accepted advice from him, instructed him to draft
the documents, authorized him to negotiate for it and paid his fees for all of this. Snow,
therefore, had actual authority and American is bound by all his acts and representations
within the course of that employment even if it did not authorize all of the specific *ts.
Furthermore, by placing Snow in a position to speak for it and making all communicati is
to Margetts through Snow, American clothed Snow with apparent authority to act for and
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bind it and Margetts was justified in relying on the statements made by Snow. Furthermore,
American, and New West, had no qualms about accepting the benefits of the agreement
with Margetts. It received and kept what it set out to obtain from Margetts with no concern
that Margetts didn't receive what he was promised in return. That constitutes ratification
and estops it from denying Margetts the benefit he was to receive.
New West has received from Terrace Falls a conveyance of the whole project,
including the name "Terrace Falls" and the business of selling of condominium units.
Terrace Falls is left with nothing (except a release of liability) and New West has everything.
As the successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls, New West became Terrace Falls and still
operates as Terrace Falls Condominiums. It is, therefore, responsible for its obligations,
especially those incurred in obtaining the releases required to complete the transfer.
The facts

of this case constitute

fraud,

duress, mistake, negligent

misrepresentation, unconscionability and unfair dealing which entitle Margetts to rescission
and return to the status quo ante or to damages for the loss to him.
The awarding of the condominium to New West and the loss of Margetts'
payments of $159,234 constitute an unconscionable forfeiture. The least that Margetts is
entitled to is a judgment of $142,134 as the difference between the amount forfeited by
Margetts and the actual damages suffered by New West.
There was no occupancy agreement upon which the court could base its award
of rental value and the essential elements of unjust enrichment were not pleaded nor
proved. In particular, New West has failed to show that it was inequitable for Margetts to
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retain the benefit of occupancy of the condominium, while New West retained the
condominium that Margetts had paid for and did not receive.
Instead of pursuing one of the normal remedies available to it to obtain
possession of the condominium, New West attempted to utilize the summary procedures of
the Unlawful Detainer Statute but without complying with the strict requirements of that
statute. An award of damages under that statute is, therefore, improper.
A judgment for attorney's fees in favor of New West is also improper because
there is no statute or contract which authorizes such an award and there was no evidence
before the court upon which an award of fees could be based. The only possible justification
for an award of attorney's fees would require the court to hold that the Twenty Percent
Agreement, the subject of the dispute in this case, was a part of the Condominium Purchase
Agreement which authorizes an award of fees and, therefore, Margetts' view of the whole
agreement would be adopted and judgment must be entered in his favor on the merits as
well as to attorney's fees.
Judgment should be entered in favor of Margetts rescinding the transaction and
reinstating his lien or awarding him ownership of the condominium, and his costs and fees.
In the alternative, a judgment should be awarded to Margetts in the amount of $142,134 for
the unconscionable forfeiture. In any event, the judgment in favor of New West can not be
justified and must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
BACprtPZUa^
& MARSH
Ralph J. Mafrsh
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

1. Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision, dated February 20, 1992.
2. Portions of Exhibit 4: Real Property Purchase and Sale Agreement, dated November 19,
1984.
3. Exhibit 7: Condominium Purchase Agreement, dated November 14, 1984.
4. Exhibit 10: Twenty Percent Agreement, dated November 14, 1984.
5. Exhibit 16: Twenty Percent Agreement, dated November 14, 1984.
6. Utah Code Annotated:
§ 78-36-3 Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life.
§ 78-36-6 Notice to quit - How served.
§ 78-36-10 Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent.
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Loan Association, successor-ininterest to American Savings
and Loan Association,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)
Case No. 900409-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
F I L E D
(February 2

John L. Margetts,

PiTho

Defendant and Appellant,

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys:
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Mary T. ?Joonan
Cterk of tho Court
R a l p h J . M a r s h , S a l t Lake C i t y , f o r AppelJS^rifctmufApfnrate
W. C u l l e n B a t t l e and C r a i g T. J a c o b s e n , S a l t Lake
City for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
John L. Margetts appeals from a judgment against him for
breach of contract and unlawful detainer. Margetts claims that
American Savings and Loan Association (American), predecessor-ininterest to New West Federal Savings and Loan, was also in breach
of contract for failure to give him twenty percent of the sale
proceeds from five units he helped sell in Terrace Falls
Condominiums. In the alternative, Margetts requests rescission
of his agreement with American to buy a unit in Terrace Falls on
the grounds of fraud and other defenses to the formation of a
contract. Margetts also seeks disqualification of the law firm
of Fabian & Clendenin for a conflict of interest.
The trial court denied Margetts's motion to disqualify and
found, in relevant part, as to the other issues raised by these
facts that
9. The Agreement, dated November 14, 1984
between Margetts and Terrace Falls, which has
been referred to by the parties as the "20%
Agreement" . . . was executed by Margetts and
Terrace Falls only.

0C543

10• American Savings did not agree to
perform any obligations under the 2 0%
Agreement.
11. American Savings did not otherwise agree
to assume any obligations of Terrace Falls or
its principals to Margetts.
12. No fraud was committed by American
Savings, or its agents or attorneys, in
connection with the negotiation and execution
of the Purchase Agreement, the Settlement
Agreement, the 2 0% Agreement or the other
documents referred to above.
13. Even if Gerald Snow, who was Terrace
Falls' attorney, had made material
misrepresentations of fact to Margetts in
connection with the execution of those
documents, any reliance by Margetts upon
those misrepresentations would have been
unreasonable because:
(a) Margetts recognized that the
20% Agreement was inconsistent with
Snow's alleged representations;
(b) Margetts was represented by an
attorney in the transaction, but he
did not consult with that attorney
regarding the apparent
inconsistency between the agreement
and the alleged representations;
(c) Margetts did not request that
the alleged representations be
memorialized in writing; and
(d) Margetts never inquired about
Mr. Snow's authority to bind
American Savings.
14. Mr. Snow did not have actual or apparent
authority to enter into agreements in behalf
of American Savings, or to modify existing
agreements.
Margetts alleges that Snow came to him privately, after
earlier attempts to reach a settlement had failed, and offered
him a deal to release his lien. According to Margetts, the deal
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included a $150,000 credit towards the purchase of a condominium
unit, and a right to receive twenty percent of the proceeds from
the sale of other units. Margetts alleges that Snow assured him
that, after receiving his share of proceeds under the Twenty
Percent Agreement, his unit would be completely paid for and he
would recoup any interest losses. Margetts also alleges that
Snow told him that the documents constituting the lien release
and condominium purchase agreement would not be delivered until
American Savings was bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement.
Margetts claims he released his lien and agreed to buy a unit in
Terrace Falls Condominiums from American on those conditions.
Margetts concedes that the Twenty Percent Agreement, on its
face, is between him and Terrace Falls. He alleges, however,
that Snow had promised him that there was no need to name
American as a party to the Agreement since American would become
Terrace Falls in taking over the project. Margetts also alleges
that American paid Snow to negotiate a settlement of Margetts's
claim against the project, and that Snow had actual or apparent
authority, as American's paid agent, to bind American to the
Twenty Percent Agreement. New West disputes the existence of an
agency relationship, and contends that Snow was merely Terrace
Falls's attorney because American was represented by its own
counsel. New West also argues that the intent of the Twenty
Percent Agreement was merely to prevent the Terrace Falls
partners from receiving a windfall in the sale of the project to
American.
DISQUALIFICATION
Margetts claims that he discussed the trade of his unit in a
Park City condominium with three attorneys who were then with
Fabian & Clendenin. Margetts argues that Fabian & Clendenin
should have, therefore, been disqualified as opposing counsel for
a conflict of interest. See Utah Code of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.9. Margetts relies on his own diary entries of the
discussion, but apparently did not produce them.
Fabian & Clendenin culled through its files, and found no
record of the discussion. The law firm also represented that
none of the attorneys alleged to have been involved were still
employed with the firm. However, no statements of the attorneys
named were obtained by either Fabian & Clendenin or Margetts.
The proponent of disqualification for a purported conflict
of interest bears the burden of proving the existence of an
attorney-client relationship. Cf. Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v.
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727-28 (Utah App. 1990)(in an action for
legal malpractice, the threshold question is whether an attorney-
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client relationship was established). Margetts simply failed to
sustain the necessary burden of proof concerning the legal
consultation claimed. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's
ruling denying the motion.
AGENCY
Margetts claims that American Savings is bound to the Twenty
Percent Agreement by Snow's conduct under agency principles.
Inasmuch as the question of whether an agency relationship
existed between American and Snow puts facts in dispute, see
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins., Co., 749 P.2d
651, 654 (Utah 1988), Margetts is required to marshal the
evidence in order to show that the findings of the trial court
were clearly erroneous.
The marshaling requirement, however, implies the existence
of adequate findings. In this case, the trial court merely
concluded, without further elaboration, that Snow had no actual
or apparent authority to enter into or modify existing agreements
on behalf of American. In Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah
1987), the Utah Supreme Court said "findings ^should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached./,f £d. at 999 (quoting Rucker v.
Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). The supreme court also
held in Acton that a trial court's "findings of fact must show
that the court's judgment or decree xfollows logically from, and
is supported by, the evidence.'" Id. (quoting Smith v. Smith,
726 P.423, 426 (Utah 1986)).
Because the trial court did not enter subsidiary findings to
reveal the steps by which its factual conclusion was reached, and
the facts of this case as they appear in the record are not
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding
in favor of the judgment," Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233, 236
(Utah 1983), we remand the agency issue for entry of proper
subsidiary findings of fact and conclusions of law. See \cton,
737 P.2d at 999. Recognizing that a previous decision of he
trial court may be altered on remand for additional findii s, see
Adams v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 173 Utah Ad\ Rep.
18, 22 (Utah App. 1991)(full articulation of facts and law ly
cause fact finder to reach different conclusion), "[w]e do >t
intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering anu
supporting the conclusion already reached." Allred v. Allred,
797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah App. 1990).
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FRAUD
Since the reasonableness of Margetts's reliance on the
representations of Snow was expressly contingent on the lack of
agency, we necessarily remand the issue of fraud. Although the
trial court's findings on the issue of fraud were more detailed
than the issue of agency, they also lack subsidiary findings on
what was said by Snow to Margetts. Margetts asserts that Snow
indicated it would be unnecessary to name American as party to
the Twenty Percent Agreement because American would, in effect,
become Terrace Falls as a result of the takeover. What Snow said
is, therefore, critical to a review of the trial court's findings
as to the reasonableness of Margetts's reliance.
Inasmuch as remanding the issues of agency and fraud may
affect the determination of who is at fault for failure to close
the sale, as well as the question of whether Margetts forfeited
his $150,000 credit, we also remand the issue of remedies. In
the event that the trial court again awards a similar combination
of remedies, the trial court should clarify in its ruling why
both forfeiture and rent are being awarded.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the ruling of the trial court denying the motion
to disqualify because Margetts did not satisfy his burden of
proof at trial. However, we reverse on the issue of Snow's
agency since the trial court did not make sufficient findings for
us to review. We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court
for additional findings, both as to the issues of agency and
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fraud, with leave to conduct such further proceeding
s as the
trial court may deem appropriate.

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

Regnal W. Garff, Judge
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THIS AGREEMENT

is made A/Of0t«-v4r~

w

, 1984 by

and

between AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a California
corporation,

formerly

ASSOCIATION,

a

known

California

as

STATE

corporation

SAVINGS

AND

LOAN

("American"),

and

HAROLD K. BEECHER and MARGARET BEECHER, husband and wife and
IRVIN WELLS STEVENS, JR. and DOROTHY A. STEVENS, husband and
wife ("Borrowers"), J. RON STACEY ("Guarantor") and TERRACE
FALLS CONDOMINIUMS, a Utah limited partnership ("Owner") .
1.

Recitals.

This

Agreement

is

entered

into with

respect to the following facts and circumstances:
A.

Owner is the owner of the property described in

Exhibit "A" of this Agreement and commonly known as Terrace
Falls Condominiums located between 3rd and 4th Avenues west
of "A" Street in the City and County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, including

any and all improvements

on or to such

property (the "Property").
B.

American is the beneficiary under and holds a trust

deed on the Property in favor of Utah Title and Abstract
Company as Trustee, dated December 22, 1981, and recorded
December 22, 1981, in Book 5325, Page 625, as Entry No.
3633978, of Official Records of Salt Lake County (the "Trust
Deed").
made

by

The Trust Deed secures a Promissory Note ("Note")
Borrowers

(TERUTA/01)

in

the

original

1.

principal

amount of

SIXTEEN MILLION AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($16,000,000.00), dated
December 22, 1981, The Note was modified by agreement dated
June 5, 1984.
modified

are

Borrower's obligations
guaranteed

by

the

under

personal

the Note as
guarantee

Guarantor, dated December 22, 1981 (the "Guarantee").

of

Owner

acquired the Property from Borrowers subject to the Trust
Deed

and Note in favor of American

continuing

guarantee

of Guarantor.

and subject

to the

Borrowers, Owner and

Guarantor acknowledge that payment of principal and interest
required under the Note is now in default.
C.

Common areas and shell construction plus three

units (nos. 308, 502 and 509) of the Property

are 100%

complete and a certificate of occupancy has been issured for
this part

of the work.

Finish

allowance

work

for the

remaining 77 units is 0 percent complete and certificates of
occupancy must be individually issued with respect to the
units as they are completed.
D.
outstanding

As of October 19, 1984, the principal balance
on

the

Note

is

$16,000,000.00

undisbursed L.I.P. balance of $2,476,686.00
interest

reserve

of

$394,959.00),

accrued

with

an

(including an
interest

of

$806,192.00 with per diem interest at the rate of $6,665.00.
E.

The following creditors ("Creditors") possess

claims against Owner, Borrowers
follows:

(TERUTA/01)

2.

and/or the Property, as

Creditor

Claim
$531,160.11 plus interest

Franklin Capital
(Ed Scott, Allie Gaupp)

$ 60,000.00 plus interest
Adrian L. Giles
$ 70,000.00 plus interest
Garth W. Allred
$100,821.00 plus interest
Paul Buehner
Bud Bailey Const. Co. and
Bud Bailey Const. Co. Property $ 15,000.00 plus interest
Sharing Trust
$118,925.21 plus interest
First Security Financial
(less a payment of
$49,724.45)
John L. Margetts

$200,000.00 credit plus
interest

Warrant v. Edward D. Scott

$

Judgment v. Eddie F. Scott

$ 1,236.37

Judgment v. Eddie Forrell
Scott

$

J. Ron Stacey Const. Co,

General Contractor

F.

286.25

541.00

Borrowers, Owner and Guarantor are unable to

discharge and pay the Note to American and the claims of the
Creditors and they have requested that American accept all
Borrowers' and Owner's right, title and interest in and to
the

Property

in

consideration

of American's

release of

Borrower, Owner and Guarantor from their obligations under
the Note and that American compromise the Creditors' claims
and

obtain

a

termination

and

release

of

the

general

construction contract from J. Ron Stacey Construction Co.
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3.

2.

Sale of the Property.

For the consideration and

on the terms, provisions, and conditions set forth in this
Agreement, Owner shall sell, grant, and convey to American
or to American's nominee, and American shall purchase from
Owner, the Property, together with the following:
A.

Personal

Property.

All

tangible

personal

property owned by Owner or Borrowers ("Personal Property")
now existing or on the closing date placed or installed on
or about the Property, and all of Owner's interest as lessee
under any leases of such Personal Property.

The Personal

Property is inventoried and listed on Exhibit

f,

B" attached

hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
B.

Intangible Property.

All intangible property

("Intangible Property") now or on the closing date owned or
held by Owner or Borrowers in connection with the Property,
the Personal Property, the business of selling or leasing
units, or the ownership or rental of condominiums, or in
connection with the use thereof, including but not limited
to:

(i) all of Owner's right, title, and interest in the

Property as Developer/ Declarant; (ii) all trade styles or
names used in connection with the same, including but not
limited to, the name "Terrace Falls";
plans

and

recorded

survey

under

conditions
restrictions

(TERUTA/01)

of

maps

as

the Utah
approval,

as recorded

recorded

(iii) all 01 ginal

and

Condominium

Ownership

covenants,
or proposed by

4.

required

Act,

conditions,
the

t.

be
.nd
mu.

Condomi: ^um

Ownership Act, the Planning Commission and City Council of
Salt

Lake

City

and

other

governmental

agencies

having

control over the Property; (iv) all recorded declarations,
filed articles of incorporation

and bylaws

executed

and

certified by homeowners1 association secretary or Owner that
the same conform

to the

requirement

of

the

Condominium

Ownership Act; (v) all booklets, manuals, and advertising
material; (vi) all of Owner's right, title and interest in
and to any "Initial Capital Contributions" or other payments
to

any

owners'

architectural,
plans,

association
engineering

specifications,

of

the

and

Property;

construction

drawings,

studies,

(vii) all
contracts,

reports

and

surveys, including available information on soils, geology,
archaelogy, natural hazard, solar energy or other feature of
the project; common area completion bonds; insulation data
(material thickness R-value) as required by
Trade

Commission

to

be

disclosed

to

new

the

Federal

home

buyers;

(viii) all of the contents of the tract map files held by
the County of Salt Lake in connection with the Property;
(ix) all rights of Owner derived pursuant to all fees paid,
deposits or bonds posted, including utility deposits, and
agreements made in connection with the processing of the
development of the Property; (x) all of Owner's rights under
any conditional use permits or

variances

and under

all

building permits and other "Permits" (as described in this
i
Agreement); (xi) approved assignment of all fire, hazard,

(TERUTA/01)

5.

general liability and all other insurance coverage on the
Property; (xii) any other rights of Owner or its predecessor
in

interest

negative

in connection with the Property;

declaration,

categorical

appropriate

evidence

of

Environmental

Quality Act; and

exemption

compliance

with

(xiii) any
or

other

a

State

(xiv) all Owner's

rights,

claims and causes of action and warranties from and against
the general contractor

and

all

other

persons,

firms

or

entities supplying labor, or materials for construction of
improvements on the Property including, without limitation,
claims for breach of contract or warranty and (xv) all items
ff

set forth in Exhibit

C" attached hereto relating to the

organization, management and operation of the Property as a
condominium project.
3.

Release

of Claims.

Borrowers, Owner, Guarantor

and American will cooperate to obtain general releases and
releases of trust deeds, cancellation of promissory notes
(as applicable) and releases of all the Creditors1 claims
pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreements attached
hereto

as

Exhibits

D-l

through

D-7;

and

deliver

such

releases into escrow. The Closing hereunder is specifically
contingent upon the execution and delivery of the fo agoing
general

releases,

documents

required

Creditors

under

(TERUTA/01)

recordable
to be

said

releases,

executed

Settlement

6.

and

all

and delivered b}

Agreements

in

order

ther
the
to

insure that title to the Property and Owner1s ability to
transfer the same to American is free from doubt.
4.

Consideration.
A.

Taxes.

For

and

in

consideration

of

the

transfer.to it of all right, title and interest of Owner,
Borrowers and Guarantor in the Property, Personal Property
and intangibles, American agrees to pay the real property
taxes for 1984 now due against the Property.
B.

Construction.

American* agrees

to

disburse

funds without retainage, due to the general contractor and
subcontractors, laborers and suppliers for work** performed
on the Property/-ewad—approyod^-arra^ accepted—fey—American1^—

d<& Coftyfe ruction—SuporviGion—Department-,

and to pay

Property.
Release of Borrowers, Owner

and Guarantor.

Subject to the continuing representations and warranties set
forth in this Agreement, American agrees to release and
forever
liability

discharge
under

Borrowers,

the

Owner

and

Note, Trust Deed

or

Guarantor
Guarantee

from
and

American's Loan No. 021-100312 and to cause the Trust Deed
to be released as satified and the Note to be cancelled and
redelivered.
D.

Acceptance of the Property.

Subject to the

continuing representations and warranties set forth herein,

(TERUTA/01-)

7.

/T7\xD

over all

retainages held to date on account of construction gn the

C.

/T^jJj/rfCi

9<r

American accepts the Property "as is", in its existing state
of partial completion.
E.

Payment of Creditors. American agrees to pay

all sums and deliver all documents as required of it by the
Settlement Agreements, Exhibits D-l through D-7, and to pay
owner's

attorney's

fees

in

the

amount

set

forth

on

Exhibit D-8
5.

Representations and Warranties of Borrower.

In

addition to the representations and warranties contained in
other Paragraphs of this Agreement, Borrower hereby makes

^J?Csy^i

the representations and warranties in this Paragraph each of

*V//^>

which individual representation and warranty is (i) material
and being

relied upon by American, and

(ii)/true in all

iiOi

respects as of the date of this Agreement and shall be true
in

all

respects

on

the

date, -fee—the—fees*-—of—' p^tp fyfc

closing

-Bcrrowor' o—knowledge* »>. All

representations

and warranties

shall survive the closing regardless of any investigations
American shall have made with respect to such representations and warranties prior to the closing.
A.
all

Condominiumization.

governmental

actions

have

approvals

been

taken

have

The Property
been

is zoned,

obtained,

as required by

and

all

the Condominium

Ownership Act to permit the sale of condominiums other than
the

approval

Declaration

of

by

Salt

Condominium

recording thereof.

(TERUTA/01)

the

Lake
and

City

Council

Condominium

Map

of

the

and

the

There is no pla~., study or effort by any

8.

CZ^\P
fA*™

(f)

Consents

of

general

partners to this transaction by their

and

limited

signature of this

Agreement;
(g)

Opinion

of

Owner's

counsel

that

this transaction is fully binding against Owner, Borrowers
and Guarantor;
(h)

A release executed by J. Ron Stacey

Construction terminating the general construction contract
and Letter Agreement dated March 18, 1982, and releasing
Owner,

Borrowers,

Guarantor

and

American

from

further

liability thereunder in the form attached as Exhibit G;
(i)

Releases

of

American

by

Owner,

Borrowers and Guarantor in the form attached as Exhibits H-l
and H-2;
(j)

Release

by

American

of

Owner,

Borrowers and Guarantor, by reconveyance of Trust Deed and
cancellation of Note, as set forth in Paragraph 4.C. , above;
(k)

delivery

of

all

Payment by American of all sums and
¥•. 8. *~^
documents set forth in Paragraphs. 4.E.,

above.
7.

Possession.

Possession of the Property shall be

delivered to American upon close of escrow free and clear of
all tenancies, licenses or other rights of possession or use
other than those referred to in Exhibits D-6 and D-7.
8.

Owner1s Affirmation:

Owner hereby affirms and ac-

knowledges the following:

(TERUTA/01)

17.

»

yiu C/
ijyfe

A.

Absolute

Conveyance.

The

conveyance

of

the

Property to American pursuant to this Agreement is done with
the concurrence of American, Owner

and Borrowers

and is

intended to be and will be an absolute conveyance of the
title to the Property in full and complete satisfaction of
Owner's, Borrowers' and Guarantor's liabilities to American
under the Note, Trust

Deed

and

Guarantees,

and

is not

intended as a mortgage, conveyance in trust, or security of
any kind.
are

Owner and Borrowers warrant and represent they

aware

of

the

current

value

of

the

Property,

the

Creditor's claims and cost to complete construction and they
acknowledge that by this transaction they are waiving any
equity they may have in the Property and are foregoing a
right of redemption that would exist if American pursued
foreclosure.
B.

Surrender of Possession.

Upon closing, Owner

will surrender to American possession of the Property in its
entirety.
C. Execution of Agreement Made Freely.

In execut-

ing this Agreement and all other documents contemplated by
this Agreement to effect the conveyance of the Property and
the closing, Owner, Borrowers and Guarantor are not acting
under any misapprehension, confusion, or doubt as to ~he
effect thereof, and are acting freely and voluntarily

id

with the advice of counsel and they are under no coercion or
duress from any source whatsoever.

(TERUTA/01)

18.

21,

Exhibits.

All

exhibits

referred

to

in

this

Agreement are attached to this Agreement and incorporated
herein by this reference.
Approved as to form:
Ray Quinney & Nebeker

OWNER:

By:
¥1^^
(Gerald Snow, Esq.
Owner1s Attorney

TERRACE FALLS CONDOMINIUMS,
a Utah limited partnership
By:

Stacey Development, a
Utah limited^p^r^nership,
general

By:

Wells Stevens Enterprises
a Utah limited partnership,
general partner

Address for Notice:
Deseret Bldg. 400
79 So. Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

By^
t-^L
By:

Harold K. Beecher &
Associates,
a Utah corporation,
general partner

By Tja^^CyL
'Its

I h /J^/>

*A^>-

J£AW\^U^Z

CONSENTED TO ALSO BY THE
LIMITED PARTNERS OF TERRACE
FALLS CONDOMINIUMS:
STACEY DEVELO
By:

ILLS STEVENS/ENTERI
WELLS
STEVENS/ENTERPRISES
By

Pi^CCuJA^
s ^
(TERUTA/01)
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Harold K. Beecher,
Individually
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CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT

^L.,t1J'";r

THIS AGREEMENT .is.made and entered into this . V
day
of November, 1984, by and between AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN*
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation ("Seller"), and JOHN L. MARGETTS,
an individual ("Buyer").
RECITALS:
A. Seller is the owner of the* Terrace Falls Condominiums
Project located between 3rd and 4th Avenues west of "A" Street in
Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Project").
B. Buyer desires to acquire from Seller and Seller is
willing to sell to Buyer a condominium unit in the Project on the
terms and conditions herein set forth.
C. This Agreement is entered into pursuant to the terms
of that cej--t^nSe£tlement Agreement between the parties et al.,
dated OctoBer*?^ ", 1984.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:
1. The Unit. Seller does hereby agree to convey to
Buyer and Buyer does hereby agree to purchase from Seller Unit
No. 413 in the Project (the "Unit"), as the same is shown and
described in the Declaration of Condominium and Survey Map"of the
Project to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office, a copy of which is attached hereto. The foregoing
description shall be construed to describe the Unit, together with
the appurtenant undivided interest in the common areas and
facilities of the Project -(including one (1) parking space and one
(1) storage locker), and also to incorporate all the rights
incident to and limitations on ownership of a condominium unit in
the Project'-as set forth in said Declaration of Condominium. The
choice of the foregoing Unit by Buyer shall constitute a final and
irrevocable selection of a condominium unit in the Project as
specified in Paragraph 2 of said Settlement Agreement.
2. Title. Seller shall convey good and market lie title
to the Unit to Buyer, subject only to the Standard Excep ons and
Special Exceptions Nos. 2, 3 and 4 set forth in that cert, n title
insurance commitment issued by Safeco Title Insurance Comj ly
through Utah Title and Abstract Company, dated October 11, 984, a
copy of which is attached hereto, as well as to the lien fv ;
' current year taxes' not- yet due and the Declaration of Condc minium
and Survey Map of the Project yet to be filed.

3. Purchase Price. The purchase price of the Unit is
Two Hundred Ninety-Three Thousand Seventy-Five Dollars
(V293.075.00), less three percent (3.0%) thereof for the absence
of a sales commission, for a net price of Two Hundred Eighty-Four
Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars ($284,283.00). In
accordance with the Settlement Agreement mentioned in Recital C
above-v -Buyer is hereby granted a nonrefundable credit'-in the
amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) towards
the purchase price. The balance of the purchase price in the
amount of One Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred
Eighty-Three Dollars ($134,283.00) shall be due in full at the
closing as set forth hereinafter.
4.—Condition of U R J ^ H — B u y or hac inspected the >Uait,— u
which hag been finished to the shell atage with walla aheeLrockea
and tapod, and io willing to aeeept the construction of the Unit
to the extent performed to datoi
*
* ^fllld!
5. Finish Allowance. The amount of^he/fj.nisn allowance
with respect to the Unit which is to be spent^ln accordance with
Buyer's specifications is Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred
Thirty-Nine Dollars ($16,839.00). The finish allowance has been
allotted based on a standard finish package. Buyer may require
Seller to make reasonable modifications and upgrades to the
standard finish package, but all such modifications and upgrades
shall be performed entirely at Buyer's expense to the extent the
aggregate finish allowance is exceeded.
6. Possession. Possession of the Unit shall pass to
Buyer as of the closing date. Seller shall have substantially
completed the Unit to Buyer's finish specifications prior to the
closing, provided that Seller shall have a reasonable time after
the receipt of such specifications or any final change thereto (no
less than sixty (60) days) in which to complete the Unit. Buyer
shall provide Seller with Buyer's finish specifications as soon as
possible, but not later than- March 31, 1985, so that closing can
take place not later than June 30, 1985. In the event Buyer fails
to provide Seller with finish specifications by such time, Seller
shall have the right to proceed to finish the Unit in accordance
with the standard finish options then being offered to purchasers
of units in the Project.
7. Closing. The closing of the purchase and sale of the
Unit shall take place at the offices of Utah Title and Abstract
Company, 629 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, at a mutally
agreeable time, which shall be within fifteen (15) days after
written notice from Seller to Buyer that the Unit is ready for
occupancy. Readiness for occupancy shall mean that a certificate

-2-

of occupancy for ti*e Unit has/been issued by the Salt Lake City
Building Inspection Division/ At the closing, Seller shall
deliver to Buyer a Warranty Deed to the Unit and Buyer shall
deliver to Seller a cashier's check for the balance of the
purchase price, plus any additional amount due for finish upgrades
or modifications. Property taxes, insurance and closing fees shall
be'prorated irrthe usual'fashion as of-the date of-closing.- Also,
Seller shall furnish to Buyer at Seller's expense'a title
insurance policy from a reputable title insurance company insuring
title to the Unit in Buyer in the amount of the purchase price.
Title to the Unit shall be in the following name(s):
John L. Margetts and Irma W. tfargetts, Joint Tenants

.

^X*?

8. Default. If the* partti.es fail to close as set forth (Aherein through the fault of Buyer/ Buyer shall forfeit all rights
hereunder and shall have no claim against Seller, whether for
payment of any portion of the credit granted to Buyer against the
purchase price or for any other thing or amount. If there is a
delay in closing through the fault of Seller, Buyer shall be
entitled at his option to enforce this Agreement as written or to
select another available condominium unit of an equal or greater
value in place of the Unit, in which case Buyer shall receive a
credit against the purchase price of such other unit in the same
amount as the credit provided herein.
9. Assignment. This Agreement shall be freely
assignable by either party hereto.
10. Broker's Fees. Both parties represent and warrant
that no real estate broker has been involved in this transaction
and each party agrees to indemnify the other against any claims
for real estate commissions or finders fees or the like as a
result of the acts or omissions of such party.
11. Survival. The parties understand and agree that all
representations and warranties made herein are true and effective
both when made and as of the closing, and that all such
representations and warranties shall survive the closing.
12. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall inure to the
benefit of and be binding upon the parties and their respective
legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns.
13. Counterpart Originals. For the convenience of the
parties, this Agreement shall be executed in two (2) counterpart
originals, which taken together shall constitute a single
agreement.

y

""

l
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14. Notice. Any notice provided for by this Agreement
shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been given on the
date on which such notice is either hand delivered to the party to
whom such notice is directed or is deposited in the United
States
mail as a certified or registered letter, postage prepaid, return
receipt requested, pr-operly -addressed to. such party at the address
specified below:
If to Seller, at:
American Savings & Loan Association
300 North Harrison, 5th Floor
Stockton, California 95203
Attn: Real Estate Dept.
If to Buyer, at:
John L. Margetts
2182 Berkeley Street

Salt Lake City,

Utah

84109

Any such address may be changed by giving notice thereof in
accordance with the above procedure.
15. Headings. The headings of the Paragraphs herein
have been inserted for ease of reference only and shall not
control or affect the meaning or- interpretation of any of the
terms and provisions hereof.
16. Governing Law. This Agreement is entered into under
and shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah.
17. Further Action. The parties hereby agree to execute
and deliver such additional documents and to take such further
action as may become necessary or desirable to fully carry out the
provisions and intent of this Agreement.
18. Prior Agreements. This Agreement supersedes any
prior understandings or agreements between the parties, whether
written or verbal, respecting the within subject matter, including
without limitation the aforesaid Settlement Agreement, and
contains the entire undersanding of the parties with respect
thereto.
19. Force Majeure. Seller shall not be deemed to be in .
breach hereof because of any nonperformance due to war, riot or
other civil disturbance, flood, fire, natural disaster, labor
strike, or other circumstance beyond the reasonable control of
Seller. '

20. Enforcement. In the event of a dispute between the
parties arising under this Agreement, the party prevailing in such
dispute shall be entitled to recover such party's costs from the
other party, including without limitation court costs and
reasonable attorney's fees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this
Agreement on the date hereinabove first written.
SELLER:
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION
*ty

BUYER:

9009s
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AGREEMENT
IN CONSIDERATION OF and as further inducement to the
execution and delivery by John L. Margetts ("Margetts") of a
Condominium Purchase Agreement, Request for Reconveyance and
General Release, as set forth in that certain Settlement Agreement
with Americai Savings and Loan Association and Terrace Falls
Condominiums, dated October / ^ , 1984, the undersigned Terrace
Falls Condominiums and its general and limited partners do hereby
agree to assign, transfer and convey to Margetts twenty percent
(20%) of whatever they, or any of them, may ultimately receive,
if anything, after the closing of the escrow under said Settlement
Agreement, in the way of an interest in the Terrace Falls
Condominiums Project or any portion thereof or in any proceeds
from the sale of the Project or of any unit or interest therein
or any right or option to acquire such an interest; provided,
however, the value of what is assigned to Margetts hereunder shall
not exceed One Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred EightyThree Dollars ($134*283-^00) ; and provided, further, that except to
the extent this Agreement may be construed as inconsistent with
or as a modification of the aforesaid General Release, in which
case this Agreement shall prevail, said General Release is hereby
reconfirmed in all respects by Margetts. ^T^^^r^p^ccu^^f- >s *i.vir
SIGNED this //

day of November, 1984.

"3-

TERRACE FALLS CONDOMINIUMS
By:

Wells Stevens Enterprises
Its General Partner

I>-Wells Steven*
Its General Partner
Harold K. Beecher & Associates

-Harold K. Beecher, President

° / / / A^ />

^

Harold K. Beecher, Individually
Wells Stevens Enterprises
By:
I."P7§lls Stevens, Jr
General Partner
Stacey

MARGETTS:
r-r^j

John L. Margetts, Individually

/ .

<#9
Mm
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AGREEMENT

IN CONSIDERATION OF and as further inducement to the
execution and delivery by John L. Margetts ("Margetts") of a
Condominium Purchase Agreement, Request for Reconveyance and
General Release, as set forth in that certain Settlement Agreement
with American Savings and Loan Association and Terrace Falls
Condominiums, dated October
, 1984, the undersigned Terrace
Falls Condominiums and its general and limited partners do hereby
agree to assign, transfer and convey to Margetts twenty percent
(20%) of whatever they, or any of them, may ultimately receive,
if anything, after the closing of the escrow under said Settlement
Agreement, in the way of an interest in the Terrace Falls
Condominiums Project or any portion thereof or in any proceeds
from the sale of the project or of any unit or interest therein
or any right .or option to acquire such an interest; provided,
however, the value of what is assigned to Margetts hereunder shall
not exceed One Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred EightyThree Dollars ($134,283.00); and provided, further, that except to
the extent this Agreement may be construed as inconsistent with
or as a modification of the aforesaid General Release, in which
case this Agreement shall prevail, said General Release is hereby
reconfirmed in all respects by Margetts.
SIGNED this S^S

day of November, 1984.
TERRACE FALLS CONDOMINIUMS
By:

Wells Stevens Enterprises
Its General Partner
By:
I. Wells Stevens
Its General Partner

Harold K. Beecher & Assoc: ites

*tf-a/

&fei^ £&cf<.
By:
Harold K. Beecher, Presic nt

Harold K. Beecher, Individually7
Wells Stevens Enterprises

By:
I . Wells S t e v e n s , J r .

STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Code Annotated
§78-36-3 Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life.
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful
detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or period for
which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether established by
express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be terminated
without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly
or other periodic rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the
end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent,
or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to the end of
that month or period, has served notice requiring him to quit the premises at
the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(c) when he continues in possession in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in the
alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises,
has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after service, which
notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or when
he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when
he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, and
remains in possession after service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property,

served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within three
days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other person
interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the covenants and
conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be
performed, then no notice need be given.
§78-36-6 Notice to quit - How served.
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served:
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to the
tenant at his place of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his lace of residence or from his usual place of
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place of
residence or place of business; or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place of
residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased
property. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner.
§78-36-10 Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent - Immediate
enforcement - Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the
restitution of the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, or after default in the pi ment of
rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agre nent.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or up. i the
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the p. itiff
from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;

(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is
alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; and
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after
default in the payment of rent.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2) (a)
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in
the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced
immediately.

